Pivoting Great Powers

 In geopolitics, pivoting is not something only pivot-states do.

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The current debate concerning the management of international relations centres around two key concepts: multipolarity and unipolarity. The opposition of the two concepts is creating a lot of tensions and global security headaches at present, as the Ukraine war illustrates. Consequently, it is worth recalling the origins of multipolarity and of its counterpart, unipolarity.

Multipolarity has a proven historical track record of keeping the peace between great powers, through its balance of power mechanism. It originated in Europe and flourished after the fall of Napoleon, when it included 5 great powers: Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia. Through regular meetings between them, the five powers succeeded in keeping relative peace in Europe for a hundred years, until 1914.

Unipolarity was born out of the ashes of the bi-polar world around the year 2000, being the brainchild of American neoconservatives, with no precedent in modern history. In assuming the role of the only hegemonic power, the US has engaged in almost continuous warfare in the Middle East, Asia and now in Europe, violating - in the process - the UN charter and provoking the devastation of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Ukraine. 

In the first decade of the 21st century, a number of former and current military powers from Asia and Europe, such as China, France, Russia or Germany, have started to push for the demise of unipolarity and for the transition to a European-style multipolar world order, dominated initially by 4 great powers: the US, the EU (the Franco-German alliance), Russia and China. ( A 5th member, India, would join this exclusive great power club in the next few years). By the end of the current decade, this multipolar system will very likely replace the broken unipolar system put in place by the US two decades ago.

One other issue that is connected with the advent of multipolarity is that of pivot states, which I have already discussed elsewhere. There is, however, one essential aspect I have omitted to mention. That is, whilst no great power can be considered a pivot state, some of them are themselves pivoting quite significantly.

The first to do so was the United States. We all remember the Obama administration's "pivot to Asia". Disappointed by Western Europe's "ungratefulness" for the role the US played in the prosperity achieved by the continent after the devastation of WWII, the Obama administration decided to turn its back on Europe and pivot towards the Pacific region and China instead.

The second superpower pivoting was the EU, under the leadership of France and Germany. After refusing to endorse the US' invasion of Iraq, the two leading European countries started lobbying for "strategic autonomy" from both the US and NATO and pivoted economically towards Russia and especially China.

The latest great power to pivot was Russia, following the 2014 Maidan coup in Kiev. Disillusioned with repeated Western invasions of its homeland and the presence of NATO at its borders, Russia itself pivoted east towards China. By 2023, the two countries concluded a comprehensive alliance, directed against what they regard as NATO's expansionist drive in Europe and Asia and against the regime-change crusade promoted by Washington recently.

The only great power that does not need to pivot and keeps to its millenary Middle Kingdom tradition is China. For a few decades now, China's huge market has become a magnet for all the other great powers, which covet Chinese low labour costs and access to the pockets of its large and growing middle class. 

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that China has emerged as the only great power interested in maintaining global peace and stability, as its contributions to the peace efforts between Iran and Saudi Arabia have recently proved.

Accordingly, US policymakers would be well-advised to abandon their mindless quest to keep unipolarity going, and to take their rightful place among the other great powers. Such a course of action could only pay dividends for global peace and prosperity.

The United States' Mad Drive for Unipolarity

 After the collapse of the USSR, unipolarity was supposed to last for no more than a decade. By extending it for two more decades, the US got embroiled in wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and now Ukraine. This has to stop before it's too late.

Over the last few days I have watched in disgust the sorry spectacle of an American president visiting the Old Continent in order to prove to the world -and probably to himself, too- that Western countries stand united behind the US in its latest proxy war. On Friday he met up with young American soldiers deployed in Poland at the border with Ukraine, he ate a pizza with them and had the cheek to lie to them with a straight face as he tried to explain why the United States are putting them in harm's way, some 8,000 kilometres from their home country. He told them that they are there to  fight for democracies against autocracies, which - it goes without saying - the US is ready and willing to spend blood and treasure to defend.

Well, not quite. The real reason why US soldiers are being posted in Eastern Europe is to defend American unipolarity against multipolarity, which has been the natural state of affairs in international relations for centuries. As we know from the examples of Napoleon and Hitler, power is a heavy drug which makes political leaders act in dangerous, if not always catastrophic ways. Unchecked, unrestrained power - because this is what unipolarity is all about - is far worse, however, and that's what has brought the world to the brink of a fully-fledged nuclear war this time.

I have also watched in disbelief over the past few weeks how the US - which has interfered irresponsibly in Slav and in European affairs since 2014 - is propping up a Kiev regime bent on starting WWIII in order to weaken its larger neighbour, Russia. The US has not made the slightest effort to lean on the Ukrainian leadership to sue for peace, but is instead using Ukrainian people as cannon fodder, and the rest of Europe as a refugee camp only to provoke regime change in Moscow. Russia's cardinal sin, it appears, is that of being one of the main challengers to the unipolarity of the US in world affairs.

Unfortunately for all concerned, unipolarity cannot be saved. Regardless of how many allies the US enlists in this quest and how many inept sanctions they pile on Russia, (which are sure to be extended to China in the future, as well). As no sane political leader can disregard geopolitical imperatives in the conduct of foreign relations, like the US has for the past few decades, nor can unipolarity be enforced for long against multipolarity. Thus, although Zelensky wants Joe to be the "leader of the world", the truth of the matter is that this is not his choice or Joe's to make. 

After Joe Biden was inaugurated as president, an American geopolitician friend of mine, who shall remain anonymous, described him as "not the sharpest knife in the drawer". After watching the American president for about one year go about "solving" international crises from Afghanistan to Ukraine, I can now confidently confirm that my American friend's assessment was an understatement. The US president is not only overwhelmed by the crisis in Ukraine, but his neocon team is a menace to world peace, and his monumental misunderstanding of the US's place in international affairs is there for all to see.

For most of us from Europe, the conflict in Ukraine is an internal problem of the Slav world. The other major ethnic groups that compose the EU - the Latins and the Germans - do not exhibit such fratricidal tendencies and get along fine with each other and with Russia. Similarly, an armed conflict between the countries of the Anglosphere has been inconceivable for more than 200 years. The attitude of the Ukrainians, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks in this conflict is -for the rest of the Europeans - puzzling, to say the least. Furthermore, neighbouring countries like Hungary and Romania see no valid reason why they should become involved in the Ukrainian mess, were it not for American pressure. In hindsight, the inclusion of Slav nations of Europe in NATO might have been another major error, on top of the admission of Baltic states.

I cannot call myself a Trump supporter, but I have to admit that his loss of the 2020 elections proved to be an unmitigated disaster, both for the United States and the world as a whole. As a businessman, Donald Trump at least understood the fact that the US cannot go about invading countries indefinitely or sponsoring pointless resistance movements, like in Syria or now Ukraine, and he was willing to adjust American foreign policy accordingly. With Donald Trump in charge of the White House, the Russian intervention in Ukraine would possibly have never happened.

The sooner American elites and foreign policy circles can acknowledge the huge risks involved in keeping up their claim to unipolarity, the better it would be for the world as a whole. I say this because by keeping up the fight to remain sole hegemon, the US runs the risk of not only losing its current (undeserved) status, but also of destroying large areas of the world in the process.

Rolling Back NATO

 Rolling back NATO is not proof of weakness, but of the existence of superior American statecraft skills, as well as a willingness to avoid nuclear catastrophe.

In the fall of 2008 I happened to be in Toulouse studying in the city's library. It is there that I saw a poster announcing a public conference organised at Sciences po on the 11th of November, featuring the Estonian ambassador to Paris. I decided to attend, only to realise that for the ambassador, the conference was an exercise in Russia-bashing, intended to elicit French sympathy for the poor Estonian people having to put up with life next door to their vastly bigger neighbour.

The Science po conference came only a few short months after the Georgian war from August 2008, during which another minuscule European country hoping for NATO accession dared to attack the Russian army stationed in Abkhazia and Ossetia. I also knew that the Estonians had previously stoked up inter-ethnic tensions in their country, including by provoking the Russian minority in Tallinn with the removal of the monument erected in honor of the Soviet soldiers from the centre of the city to its outskirts.

At the end of the conference I was allowed to speak to the audience, reminding them that the 11th of November was Armistice Day, marking the end of the First World War, which resulted in more than 50 million victims. I also reminded the Estonian ambassador that WWI was sparked by an incident provoked by Serbs, who had wanted to expand into Bosnia-Herzegovina but couldn't because it was administered at the time by the Austro-Hungarian empire. The cataclysmic event which followed, I said on that occasion, made large countries in Europe, like France, become extra cautious about being dragged into conflicts with other large nations by insignificant countries, like Serbia, Georgia or Estonia. Naturally, as an historian I knew that behind the bellicose stance of such stamp-size nations are some circles of freemasonry who use them as triggers for starting wars with enemies whose countries they intend to destroy or take over. In our nuclear age, however, this practice does not justify repeating the errors of the past, allowing major European nations to be tricked into yet another major conflict with Russia.

When it comes to Russia, what American policymakers fail to realise is that this country is currently engaged in an existential fight for survival as a state, with the US and its NATO allies. This fight is not about the preservation of its status as global hegemon, as is the case of the United States, or about any desire of Russia's to acquire such a status. No, this is a fight that Russians cannot afford to lose and will not lose. 

Furthermore, for American policymakers it would be an illusion to think that Russia, in order to defend itself, will use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, or in any other European country for that matter. It follows that the most effective strategy to eliminate the threat posed by NATO on Russia's doorstep would be to deal a mortal blow to the country chiefly responsible for the problem, which is the United States. The 2 "generals" who always protected the US against invasion, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, make America more vulnerable to a nuclear attack than any other continent except Australia or South America, which do not possess nuclear capabilities and are not a target of Russia's ire. The experts who think this is a repeat of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis are, therefore, dead wrong. A comprehensive nuclear attack against the US is very much on the table if it continues to be on a collision course with Russia over NATO expansion. 

The current predicament in US-Russia relations, however, should not have to reach that point. American policymakers have the option of announcing a rollback of NATO from the Baltic states, preventing the Russians from starting another military conflict with the same objective. By extending an olive branch to Russia in this way, the US would prove that it does have the statecraft skills needed to correct its mega errors in the field of geopolitics, made by State Secretaries from the euphoric nineties, and that it finally understands the importance of Russia's security. (Unfortunately for the Anglo-Saxon powers, Spykman elaborated his Rimland theory before the end of the Second World War and the existence of nuclear bombs or guided missiles. )

From time immemorial, small nations like the Baltic states have had to learn to live in peace with their much larger neighbours, regardless of whether they succeeded in preserving their independence or not. In the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, including them into NATO was a catastrophic mistake which should be corrected as soon as possible. After all, a status of neutrality similar to that of Finland or Sweden and membership of the EU are sufficient to guarantee their safety and prosperity.

By now everyone agrees that: first, NATO is overextended, and second, that there is no place for the US and its NATO allies in Russia's backyard. By formally acknowledging this through the announcement of a NATO rollback, US policymakers would show the world that their country still has what it takes to act as a responsible and peace-loving nation. This shouldn't be regarded as a sign of weakness on America's part, but rather as proof that the US has the ability to manage international crises, like the one we are going through right now. This is so because not assisting Ukraine militarily in this conflict is just a small step in the right direction, but not nearly enough to prevent a future nuclear conflict with Russia.

All Hegemons Have an Expiry Date

 A day after Jake Sullivan's 7-hour meeting with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi, questions remain about the true objectives of the American "negotiators".

I, for one, am inclined to believe that Sullivan was instructed to use a carrot-and-stick approach with China. Over the past few years, China-bashing by various White House administrations has not yielded any practical results, so the overused threat of sanctions if China does not align itself with the US against Russia would not have worked by itself. 

It is entirely conceivable, therefore, that during the 7 hours of talks Sullivan might have alluded to "giving" China chunks of Russian territory in case wider conflict erupted and the Chinese came on board. Similar techniques were used by Henry Kissinger in the 70s to divide the former communist bloc and they worked. 

This time, however, China is a much more prosperous country and, as such, cannot embark on an anti-Russian course without risking serious consequences, nor does it want to. The United States cannot conceivably hope to stop China helping Russia, if needed, as both countries share the same continent and the same strategic interests, while being the targets of various sanctions and hostile propaganda from Washington.

The role of "masters of the universe" played by the United States over the last 20 years is fast becoming untenable , as the demise of the US as the sole hegemon is approaching. Sadly, instead of opting for a more rational organisation of decisionmaking in world affairs, officials of the current American administration prefer to evade reality and cling to the forlorn hope of keeping the world still, with them on top.

Now more than ever, the American foreign policy establishment needs to display clear thinking and set for the United States achievable objectives instead of ideological ones. This means that its top diplomats should stop pushing liberal democracy worldwide, as this lacks exportable qualities and is intensely disliked by at least two thirds of the world, from Russia and Asian countries, to the Islamic world and Africa. By the same token, the Americans should stop lecturing and moralising foreign leaders and countries and instead sit down with them at the negotiating table, fully taking into consideration their grievances and security concerns. 

Unfortunately, by walking the current path, the White House team - from the President down to Victoria Nuland at the State Department, who were the original architects of the events in Ukraine's Maidan - run the huge risk of getting their country into nuclear conflict with Russia.

The US are Acting on the Wrong Philosophical Assumptions about History

 When foreigners or Americans themselves are complaining about the US, they usually take aim at its political and economic elite, institutions, its foreign policy, the military or America's cultural or global ambitions.

Few, however, are aware of the fact that powerful nations are run according to an agenda that incorporates a specific interpretation of history:  a historical algorithm, so to speak. By and large, this philosophical interpretation of world history goes a long way towards explaining why nations like the United States behave the way they do.

From the Age of Enlightenment we have inherited a conception about the historical evolution of humanity which in most cases is depicted as both irreversible and unidirectional, or as some specialists call it, linear. In the 19th century Hegel, a German philosopher of history, refined this approach by adding a final destination to this linear historical evolution, which he called "the end of history" (in his view, German history ended with the formation of the Prussian state). Karl Marx was one of his students and he devised his own end-of-history , which was supposed to happen when the proletariat would get on top of the capitalist class for good. The type of society he imagined was called communism, in which exploitation of any kind would completely disappear and  perfect equality would reign among all members of society.

One of the legacies that Marxist philosophy of history left behind was a partition of history according to different types of societies, defined by their specific modes of production. Thus, humanity advanced from prehistorical hunter/gatherers to the classical, slave-owning ancient societies, on to feudal societies, which gave birth to what Marx called capitalist societies, in their turn the harbinger of future communist societies. And herein lies one of his biggest errors. According to a number of social scientists like Eugene Buret, or renowned economists such as J.A. Schumpeter,  capitalist society is not a new and entirely different type of society if compared to the feudal one, but just the decaying phase of medieval Western society. 

In other words, what we were conditioned by Marx to believe about the existence of capitalist and communist societies is basically wrong. If, on the other hand, we look at capitalism (in the west) and communism (in the east) as simply the decomposing phases of feudal societies, many aspects about the organisation and functioning of capitalist or communist societies become more comprehensible from a sociological point of view. What is important to note at this point is that whereas decaying medieval Western societies turned capitalist, decaying feudal Eurasian or Asian societies turned communist. 

It is useful to remember that both capitalism and communism have facilitated the transition of entire nations from agricultural countries to industrialised and urbanised ones in a relatively short period of time, albeit using vastly different methods in achieving these goals. Both types of transition, however, have been marred by extremely painful dislocation, misery and in some cases millions of casualties.

The most problematic part of the historical algorithm used to elaborate political, geostrategic and military agendas is that which refers to the evolution of humanity as a whole. Thus, if Hegel and Marx were right, then under certain conditions historical evolution will stop after reaching a peak, after which the history pages in the book of life will remain blank. A version of this misguided interpretation of historical evolution was given to the American public by Francis Fukuyama, who in 1992 published his essay "The End of History and the Last Man".

Like Hegel before him, Fukuyama believed that after the 1991 implosion of the USSR the end of history was in sight. In his view this consists of the universal adoption of market economics principles and of liberal democracy as a political system. His interpretation of world history and especially his end-of-history thesis has informed  the political action of the US and that of American neoconservatives since 2000. To this day, neocons wrongly believe that because the US is the only superpower left, it should retain the status of world hegemon for at least another century.

What actually happened after the implosion of the bipolar world was - after a brief unipolar moment - the advent of the multipolar world, which the US alone adamantly opposes.

In fact, a much more fruitful approach to understanding the historical evolution of humanity could be found in the writings of Italian philosopher of history Giambattista Vico. In his "Scienza Nuova", he postulated that human societies have a cyclical - instead of linear - evolution. Vico's definition of progress differs from that of Kant or Hegel, for example, who were firm believers in the infallibility of human reason. For Vico too, reason was the catalyst for human progress. However, Vico believed in the possible collapse of reason at some point, which in turn could cause civilisational collapse. In other words, he was convinced that a breakdown in reason can cause man to revert to an earlier, barbarous state.( His approach could for example better explain how the excesses of nazism and even communism were ever possible.)

In this cyclical paradigm of evolution, a fallen empire like Rome, for example, partially re-emerged in a different form in 800 under the name of The Holy Roman Empire (considered by Popes as the secular arm of the Church), and it was arguably the most powerful European feudal state during the Middle Ages. The Holy Roman Empire lasted for a thousand years until 1806, when it was replaced by the Confederation of the Rhine by Francis II, the Austrian emperor. After the reunification of German states around Prussia in the 19th century, the rise and the fall of the German empire in the 20th century, the partition of Germany after 1945 and its reunification in 1991, the German federal state is still the most powerful country in the EU.

Yet another example is the recent re-emergence of China as an economic powerhouse, after what the Chinese call "the century of humiliation", with the Chinese share of global GDP  approaching again 25 percent, as it did around the year 1800. 

Russia, too, has put the trials and tribulations of empire collapse and 70 years of communism behind her and is fast re-emerging as the leading Eurasian military power, a status that it used to hold undisputed from the middle of the 18th century. 

Such examples conclusively prove that today's American policymakers would be well-advised to discard theories of history, like Fukuyama's, that can only lead to huge errors, especially in foreign policy. Adopting a cyclical approach to assessing historical developments could indeed yield much more positive outcomes for American experts and politicians alike.

Accordingly, German reunification and de facto leadership of the EU, the re-emergence of Russia as a major military power in Eurasia, or China's rise as a global economic actor should be considered normal historical developments . Moreover, even these countries' quest to have their spheres of influence recognised has deep historical roots and should be considered by Washington as legitimate, instead of being treated as offensive, as it is now the case.

Vladimir Putin's Take on Russian History

 

British historian Dominic Sandbrook tries to explain to Western audiences bored with the study of history that for the nations of Eastern Europe history matters enormously.

He claims that Vladimir Putin is by no means the successor of Stalin - who was Georgian - but that he considers himself as a successor at the helm of the Russian state built by Peter the Great . Thus, in a historical essay published on the website of the Russian presidency, Vladimir Putin states unequivocally that the Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians all have the same origin and hail from the Ancient Rus, even if throughout history there have been divisions between them.

Romanians can very well relate to this approach to Russian history. For at least two centuries, all Romanian intellectuals have stated with one voice that Moldovans, Wallachians and Transylvanians "all hail from Rome", that they belong to the same people, sharing a common origin and language. Putin says exactly the same thing about Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, and I - as an historian - don't think he is wrong .

In other words, Putin is not a kind of post-Soviet leader like Nazarbayev, for example, eager to rebuild the USSR, as the recent neocon campaign in the US would have us believe. No, he is a nationalist leader and is mainly interested in restoring unity to the Russian world. That's why I don't think Putin is a danger to the former Soviet satellites, like  Romania . Bringing the USSR back to life in a  new form is not on the Kremlin's geopolitical agenda.

What is happening now with regard to Ukraine is therefore the consequence of Putin's nationalist approach to the history of Russia, which in his view involves a multidimensional effort aimed at restoring in time the economic and political unity of the Russian world, in the sense that it was first achieved  by Peter the Great in the 18th century.

The EU in the Age of Geoolitics

 January 4, 2016

At the beginning of the year, it has become customary for ‘pundits’ to make predictions about forthcoming developments which might affect the global economy, elections in leading countries or international relations. From my part, I would like to take my readers back in time, in an attempt to make today’s armed conflicts around the world easier to understand.

This approach is all the more necessary as virtually all of today’s armed conflicts – in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Iraq or Yemen – have geopolitics as a common denominator. Even ISIS has a clearcut geopolitical agenda of sorts, namely that of establishing an “Islamic caliphate” in territories snatched from war-torn Syria and Iraq. Taken together, these tensions and conflicts among ethnic, religious or military blocs have brought to an untimely end the era of globalization and ushered in the Age of Geopolitics. But where did it all start ?

Over the past sixty years, specialists and the European general public were led to believe that geopolitics died together with Nazi Germany and was replaced with the ideological confrontation between the capitalist and communist worlds commonly referred to as the Cold War. Yet by the 1970s, as the confrontation apparently led to a stalemate, geopolitical-type conflicts again started to prove their usefulness for policymakers intent on destabilizing their opponents’ camp.

In Europe, conflicts of a geopolitical nature were rekindled by stealth courtesy of the United States. Thus, during the seventies the Ceausescu regime, fearful of being axed by the Soviets following the Prague Spring, was encouraged to denounce the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and pushed some of the country’s historians into demanding the return of Bessarabia within Romanian borders. That geopolitical conflict is still very much alive today, with Romania, the EU and the Russian Federation involved in a tug-of-war confrontation over the future of the Republic of Moldova.

As it turned out, in the end the Soviets lost their post-WW II domination of Central and Eastern Europe following a decade of cooperation between the CIA and the Vatican – which led to the formation of the Solidarnosc trade union movement and the organization of free elections in Poland – and not as a result of the geopolitical, USA-backed proxy confrontation between the Ceausescu regime and Moscow.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, geopolitical conflicts have made a spectacular return to Europe, in Yugoslavia. The separation of Slovenia and Croatia, the two Catholic regions of the Yugoslav federation, is likely to have been requested to the Western alliance by the Vatican as a reward for its successful assistance in undermining the Soviet Union during the eighties. It is also very likely that US strategists did not in fact plan for the total destruction of the Yugoslav federation, but for a diminished one, after which Serbia could be allowed to control the remainder of the territory. As events unfolded, however, the Macedonians and Albanians also decided to secede, spelling the end of the Yugoslav state.

Since 2001, the US has openly embarked on a drive to stoke geopolitical conflicts in places around the world where it wanted to expand or consolidate its hegemony. In Europe this drive led to the 2004 colour revolutions in Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia, as well as the 2008 Georgian war, and culminated in 2014 with the toppling of the elected government of Ukraine by the CIA-backed Maidan movement.

In the Arab world, the US and some of its European allies like France and the UK gave full backing to armed groups involved in the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, or in the civil war in Syria, sometimes in alliance with Saudi Arabia and/or Turkey. The Russians and the Chinese have either been largely neutral in these conflicts or have sided with the embattled Syrian regime, which for more than four years is fighting some of the most dangerous terrorist groups on the planet.

For the EU, the price to pay for the US’ post-cold war geopolitical forays in Eastern Europe and the Arab world is staggering.

Already affected by years of stagnation after the 2008 financial crisis, EU countries have lost tens of billions of euros in trade with Russia, following the Washington-dictated sanctions against this country which prompted the Russians to reply in kind. At least ten billion euros more is the likely cost for resettling the 1 million Syrian refugees within the EU, an amount that does not include the 3 billion euros promised by the European Commission to Turkey so far, in a futile effort to convince this country to stem the flow of Europe-bound refugees.

Geopolitics as a field of study can not only provide us with a better understanding of what is at stake in today’s conflicts, but also with some insights into what the future could bring.

In the Middle East, the Sunni-Shia confrontation between the region’s main powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, is likely to continue for years to come. We are in all likelihood entitled to expect that the Alawite minority in Syria will establish its own separate state, as are the Kurds from northern Iraq and parts of today’s Syria, much to the chagrin of Turkey. The rest of the Syrian territory and possibly parts of Iraq will probably emerge as a new Sunni state entity, as sectarian conflicts will prevent the continued existence of Syria and Iraq in their current form.

For the European Union, Ukraine is poised to play the same role as Afghanistan in the demise of the Soviet Union. The unwise decision to back American neocon planners will thus backfire and hasten the EU’s own demise in the process. The main catalyst for its undoing are the nationalistic movements gaining in strength, from the UK and France in the West, to Hungary and Poland in Central and Eastern Europe. The continent is already back to barbed-wire fences not only in Ukraine, but also in Hungary, Austria and Germany – a trend that will mean the final collapse of the Schengen area in the following years, if not as early as 2016.

All these developments combined suggest one thing. Namely that, when compared to Russia, China or the United States, the European Union is the worst-equipped entity to survive in the age of geopolitics and deal with its consequences.

Turkey's Confused Geopolitics

 November 27, 2015

The downing of a Russian jet over Syria by the Turkish military brings to a sad conclusion a hitherto promising international relations agenda, whose author was none other than Ahmet Davutoglu, the current Turkish prime minister.

Only a few years ago, Davutoglu as Turkey’s foreign minister advanced a “zero problems with the neighbours” diplomatic agenda. Turkey’s economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow, meanwhile, had evolved from fair to excellent, as one would expect from two major Eurasian powers with similar development objectives and interests in the region spanning from Central Asia to the Middle East.

The two countries – Russia and Turkey – are neither European nor entirely Asian. They are neither rich nor poor and both have experienced problems with Islamic radicalism or outright terrorism. For a while, even in military terms, Turkey has tried a few years back to leave the Cold War-era NATO structures and seek admission within the SCO, the new up-and-coming security organization designed specifically for dealing with the challenges of the Eurasian region.

Not anymore. Since the war in Syria, the Turkish leadership’s geopolitical agenda got confused. Ankara’s ambition of exporting its Islamic brand of democracy to the Arab world, from Tunisia to Egypt or Syria, is now in shambles.

Internally, Turkey is nowadays a divided country as a result of the November 1st parliamentary elections that gave, nevertheless, the AK Party another mandate to stay in power a few years longer.

The 2002 victory of political Islam was a direct consequence of the failure of the Turkish brand of secularism to build a truly democratic and inclusive society. Subsequent efforts by the AKP to give Kurds more autonomy and recognize the rights of the Alevi religious minority have similarly failed, transforming Turkey into a reluctant and erratic NATO ally, a menacing neighbour for Greece and the European Union as a whole and, as of a few days ago, an enemy of Russia.

Undaunted, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has failed to see the error of his ways and is blindly pushing for a re-write of the Turkish constitution that would change the country from a parliamentary to a presidential republic which nobody seems to want, not even some leading figures within the AKP.

Since the war in Kosovo and the invasion of Iraq, the world has slowly abandoned globalization as a universal objective of economic and political development. What we are currently witnessing is the onset of the age of geopolitics, characterized by a plethora of civil wars, like in Syria, Iraq or Libya, and of proxy wars between military blocs, such as the one in Georgia (in 2008) or the present-day war in Ukraine, not to mention the conflict in Yemen and beyond in the Middle East.

In such troubled times, it is imperative for large countries like Turkey to articulate a revamped geopolitical agenda for its leadership. The further Islamization of Turkish society is definitely not the answer to its current predicament, while economic and military conflict with its much larger and much more powerful Eurasian neighbour Russia should have been avoided at all costs.

Moreover, being soft on ISIS, selling weapons and buying oil from them – a fact uncovered by both the American and the Russian intelligence establishments – will not bring about a quick demise of the Assad regime, as Ankara expected. As Vladimir Putin correctly observed, the military situation in Syria cannot change by bombing campaigns alone. Since all interested countries in the Syrian developments are reluctant to provide boots on the ground, Assad’s army, with its Hezbollah associates, is the only force involved in large-scale ground operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups.

Last but not least, Turkey would be well-advised to reverse its current practice of allowing waves of Syrian migrants to cross to Europe in their hundreds of thousands. The recent approach adopted by the AKP in their negotiations with the EU has an important blackmail component and could turn decisively the entire European Union, Germans included, against Turkey. Already it stands to lose tens of billions of dollars in lost tourism revenue from Russia, as well as from exports and projects in that country. If German tourists were likewise of a mind to punish Ankara for allowing the migrant exodus towards Europe, then the entire Turkish economy would nosedive and growth would evaporate altogether.

One can only hope that sanity will prevail in the end, that Turkey will apologize to Russia and start to live up to its responsibilities when it comes to stopping the current wave of Syrians en route for Europe. After all, Turkey – and not the EU – was the most enthusiastic and vocal supporter of the anti-Assad rebellion in Syria…