How Pivot States Can Affect Global Peace and Security

 The transition from American unipolarity to a multipolar world order is well and truly underway and cannot be reversed. When dealing with threats to international security, Western policymakers should contemplate action starting from this new reality. 

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On the 1st of January 2014, four researchers from The Hague and London published a ground-breaking research report on pivot states and their role in regional and global security. The 57-page report identified 22 pivot states from Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America and listed 4 great powers currently in existence : the US, the EU, Russia and China. On its way to achieving the status of a great power, India is currently the only major regional country that still clings to its famed neutrality.

The basis of the report is - clearly - multipolarity, while the notion of spheres of interest and its importance in international relations is fully recognised as such. For the authors, the definition of pivot countries is as follows:

"Pivot states are states that possess military, economic or ideational strategic assets that are coveted by great powers. Pivot states are caught in the middle of overlapping spheres of influence of multiple great powers, as measured by associations that consist of ties that bind (military and economic agreements and cultural affinities) or relationships that flow (arms and commodities trade and discourse).

A change in a pivot state's association has important repercussions for regional and global security. States that find themselves in overlapping spheres of interest are focal points of where great power interests can collide and also clash. States located at the seams of the international system have at various moments in history been crucial to the security and stability of the international system.

Intra-state cleavages often divide pivot states. Such cleavages can be religious, ethnic, linguistic or cultural in nature, and more often than not they are a combination of all of the above. And it is precisely when these pivot states are caught in the middle, when opposing great powers push and pull in opposite directions, that they are torn apart. Hitherto weak centrifugal forces might suddenly become unleashed. Ukraine is currently succumbing to divisive forces, and Iraq is at real risk of falling apart.

In some cases there is an increased likelihood of great power conflict when pivot states fall victim to great powers encroaching on each other's spheres of influence. Great powers competing over respective spheres of influence (think here the US vs Russia) employ what is commonly called brinksmanship, either to change or, alternatively, to uphold the status quo. But brinksmanship can be exercised by pivot states too. These pivot states can be moral hazards or "rogue pivots" if they behave recklessly while betting on the opposing great power to come to their rescue. Georgia in the run-up to the 2008 war with Russia is a case in point. Georgia had been keen on bolstering ties with the West and was betting on Western assistance in its conflict with Russia, while the latter did not materialise in the end. Brinksmanship of pivot states also introduces a real risk of direct or indirect confrontation between great powers. The solution seems simple: do not let a rogue pivot state pull you into a great conflict."

The report provides a useful guide to understanding the current war in Ukraine, as well as the political instability in Georgia and elsewhere. It should be a must-read for policymakers and diplomats alike. 

By clinging to unipolarity, the US foreign policy establishment is actually depriving international relations of the needed shock absorbers and it could, unfortunately, lead the world to nuclear catastrophe.

The US' Strategic Defence Review Assessed

 January 28, 2012

The Defense Strategic Review (DSR) released by the Pentagon on the 5th of January 2012 summarises the Obama Administration’s geopolitical agenda and strategic priorities. From it, experts can discern which country is considered the new enemy of the USA, although President Obama’s speech on the occasion does not mention China by name.

In France, the refocusing of the US strategy on the Asia-Pacific region is viewed by Professor Jean-Jacques Roche from ISAD as a positive development. Whilst he observes that some of the new EU members (countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and even Romania) might express their misgivings about the planned US troops withdrawal , Western suppliers of military hardware should supposedly rejoice. Professor Roche believes that the Pentagon’s DSR could kick-start the accelerated development of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and increase the mutualisation of the defence capabilities of the EU’s member countries.

The two reasons given by the US for the elaboration of the new military doctrine are the changed geopolitical environment and the radically different fiscal circumstances. In other words, the adoption of the new strategy is supposed to save the US some $450 billion over ten years, fiscal consolidation being nowadays regarded by Washington as a national security imperative…

We can also gauge from the document who the US’ current friends and enemies are. Unfortunately, China is identified as a potential foe, in the same paragraph with Iran. In the Middle East, America’s friends and allies are the Gulf countries and Israel. In Asia, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are the allies supposed to offer the US the means of putting in place – if needed – a balance of power mechanism against China. This time around, the US needs Russia on its side, especially in the wake of the upheavals in the Middle East – hence the reset.

Interestingly enough, the Indians are advised by their own experts to refuse bandwagoning on the issue. Thus R.S. Kalha, an ex-Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notes that in the past the US had forced India to settle on Kashmir. He rightly observes that South-East Asian nations are loath to become close allies of either China or the United States, for such an option could prove disastrous for them. R.S. Kalha believes that the Indian leadership should be prudent on the matter, as a clear-cut alliance with the US might prove detrimental to Indian interests. He knows that the nature of the US – China relationship is very complex and that a military conflict between the two giants seems highly unlikely, as long as China needs the American export markets and the US needs China to continue to buy its T-bills. To be sure, the relationship between the two powers is deeper and more complex than the one established by Washington with its Soviet counterpart during the Cold War.

The reception of the Pentagon’s DSR by the Chinese government was a rather cool one. The Chinese leadership seems unwilling to intensify confrontation and to become a new cold war target for Washington. The People’s Daily has insisted that China should continue with its economic development and avoid being dragged into a military competition with the US, as the Russians had. Still, the Chinese intend to continue to take care of what they call their ‘peripheral security interests’, in spite of the new assertiveness of the new US defence policy in Asia. For all other issues, the Chinese apparently intend to cooperate with the US in solving potential tensions via dialogue. (sources: Le Monde, Pentagon Paper, People’s Daily, IDSA India)

India's New "Look East" Drive

 October 28, 2010

In a surprising turn of events, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh has this week launched his new “Look East” trade and foreign policy, during a week-long state visit to Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam.

India’s main concern these days is that of increasing the country’s foreign trade volume at least to pre-crisis levels. In Japan, premier Naoto Kan and Singh have announced the conclusion of the CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement) and together they have explored ways of increasing bilateral trade, which currently represents only 0.8 percent of Japan’s external trade.

Singh believes that significant increases in trade could be achieved because of the “complementary nature of the Japanese-Indian trade relationship”, meaning that the Japanese have the capital and technology whilst the Indians have the labour force and the market. China’s rare earth minerals embargo and ways to go around it were also on the agenda, as well as a bilateral nuclear energy cooperation deal. India would like to solve some of its energy problems by building nuclear plants with Japanese help, which, however, might not be as simple as it sounds. India’s nuclear weapons program has alienated the Japanese public and there are concerns that India has so far refused to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty – a major sticking point in the negotiations.

Discussions between the two premiers also touched on regional security issues, with Japan asking for Indian advice regarding China. Whilst agreeing to cooperate closely with Japan in avoiding security threats for the two countries as a result of Chinese assertiveness on border issues, Singh has advised his Japanese counterpart to engage China through dialogue and to use patience as a weapon.

The underlying philosophy of the latest Japan-India security partnership in Asia is spelled out by a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board in no uncertain terms. According to him, “when there is a bully in the classroom, it is important for the other students to show unity. That is the meaning of a strategic partnership”. In European parlance, the Indian official is referring to the establishment of a balance of power mechanism aimed at containing China’s Asian ambitions. Such a strategic agenda mirrors that of the US State Department’s and looks to have been heavily inspired by it.

On his Malaysian leg of the tour, premier Singh has announced the signing of yet another Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), aimed at doubling trade volumes with Malaysia by 2015, from the current $7.3 billion a year. As in Japan, security and counter-terrorism were high on Singh’s agenda. Again echoing the State Department’s latest policy initiatives, he has told his Malaysian hosts that

“in today’s unsettled world, it is all the more important for societies that are democratic, multi-religious and multicultural to work together”.

To be sure, this is exactly what Mrs Clinton has been advocating at the start of her “new American moment” crusade of democratic versus “authoritarian” states…

Aware of Indian obsessions with China’s higher growth rates, Malaysian premier Najib Razak has stated that he largely agrees with The Economist’s recent cover story on India which predicted that soon India’s economic growth might surpass all expectations. ( I have read the main article myself, which in truth is not one of The Economist’s best).

The Indian premier’s new “Look East” policy, whilst it might lead to increased trade in East Asia, is sure to lead to an increase in diplomatic tensions with China, at a time when India needs more, not less, access to Chinese markets. When trade with China will deteriorate as a result, the Indian premier and his foreign policy pundits will realise that following into Washington’s footsteps is largely a thankless task. (sources: Deutsche Welle, Asahi Shimbun, The Himalayan, The Hindu)

India's Energy Diplomacy

 October 15, 2010

If compared to China, India’s energy strategy is far less successful to date. Although it closely matches China’s (investing in oil assets worldwide, developing oil & gas fields in Iran, joining transnational pipeline projects, signing bilateral supply contracts or developing special relationships with countries such as Saudi Arabia), India’s efforts to diversify its energy supplies away from coal run into strong opposition from the United States and major logistical problems.

India’s energy needs

According to the researchers of the Council on Foreign Relations and India’s Planning Commission, the country faces formidable hurdles in meeting its current and future energy needs, if it wants to maintain its current 8 percent per year economic growth rate.

Over the next 25 years, the Indian government’s priority is the eradication of poverty. To get there, however, India will need to keep growing by 8 percent a year for the full quarter-century. Indian officials, however, fear that this noble goal is going to generate huge energy shortages, as Indiahas been less suceessful in securing energy supplies from its neighbours or from Central Asia than China has been.

The troubles of the energy sector in India are compounded by state control over the import, production and distribution of oil and gas products, which are coordinated by 4 different ministries. More than half of India’s electricity is generated by burning poor-quality domestic coal, which is expected to run out in about 40 years. Furthermore, a third of India’s oil is imported from countries the US is at odds with, such as Sudan, Syria or Iran, whilst the gas is imported mainly from Iran, Bangladesh or Burma. India’s dependence on imported oil, which currently stands at 60 percent, is expected to grow to 90 percent by 2030. That lifts energy diplomacy to the top of India’s agenda, when it comes to dealing with countries from Central Asia, Middle East, Africa or Latin America.

India’s pipeline projects

To date, India has tried to emulate China and build gas pipelines that are needed by its electricity generation sector in order to diversify away from coal. Its two projects are the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) pipeline, also dubbed “the peace pipeline”, and the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline.

First discussions concerning the IPI project started during the Clinton administration in 1993, when the so-called moderates where apparently coming to power in Iran. It involved the construction of a 2,700-km pipeline from the South Pars field in Iran, through Pakistan to India’s border, at an estimated cost of some 8 billion dollars. Beside international sanctions and US opposition which affected the project, the Iranian and Indian officials could not lock in the price for the gas to be transported, and could not agree at which border the gas supplies were going to be paid for.

Whilst the Indians insisted they were only going to pay for the gas when it reached the India-Pakistan border, the Iranians asked to be paid when the gas reached the Iran-Pakistan border. As the projected pipeline was due to pass through Beluchistan (Pakistan), home to some of the most radical Islamic tribes, India wanted to make the Pakistani government responsible for the gas’s transit through its territory, in exchange for the $1.2 per mmBtu in transit fees. Thus, practical difficulties and US opposition to the project determined India to recently abandon IPI, of which only the Iran-Pakistan stretch, or about 1,100 km, is going ahead with construction.

The failure of the IPI project has recently determined India to enter fresh negotiations with the Teheran regime for the construction of an undersea gas pipeline, which could cost 9 billion dollars. This would have the advantage of bypassing Pakistan and doing away with transit fees. Again, the project’s chances of success are slight, given the US’ opposition to investments in developing Iran’s energy sector.

In 2008, India initiated the TAPI project to bring gas from Dauletabad (Turkmenistan) to the India-Pakistan border, with a construction price tag of 3.5 billion dollars. This project is favoured by the US, but is quietly opposed by Russia, which needs the Turkmen gas for its European customers.

India, the 5th largest consumer of energy in the world, desperately needs to exponentially increase its imports of oil and gas. Consequently, it has taken an option to develop, at an estimated cost of 8 billion dollars, the Farzad-B area of the Pars gas field at the Persian Gulf, again running into some opposition from the US. Already, the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) which slaps fines on foreign companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector, has been invoked by American officials against Indian companies. As Indian companies are the biggest foreign subcontractors of IT services to US corporations, India stands to lose vital data processing business, as well as foreign currency earnings. Meanwhile, much better capitalised Chinese state oil and gas companies are aggressively investing some 20 billion dollars in the development of the South Pars gas block.

For the time being, India is being encouraged by the US to convert its gas in LNG form and transport it by tanker. It is also currently being advised by the US to develop oil and gas fields recently found on its own territory and to invest in shale deposits in the US. With so many logistical restrictions and the threat of US sanctions looming, India’s energy diplomacy agenda is becoming ever more complex. (sources: Times of India, FNA, Iran Daily, Heritage Foundation Brief, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, Hindustan Times, Financial Express, Asia Sentinel)

Disputed borders: a tripwire for war

 October 14, 2010

Whilst the world’s attention was recently focused on a relatively minor incident involving disputed islands in the South China Sea, the 4,000-km disputed border between India and China is quietly being beefed up militarily by both sides. In the words of M. Taylor Fravel, borders specialist with MIT, the border in question is “the most continuously negotiated border in modern history”.

Tensions generated by the Indian-Chinese border, which in 1962 erupted into full-fledged war between the two countries, date back to the times of the British Raj. Indeed, in 1914 the border was arbitrarily established by the simple drawing of a line on a map by Sir Robert MacMahon. Following this, in 1914 the British, on behalf of the Indians, signed the notorious Simla accord with the Tibetan government, which had briefly declared independence from China. Republican China had refused to take part in the talks and never recognised the loss of southern Tibet – a territory the size of Austria that goes these days by the name of Arunchal Pradesh – to the British colony, India.

After independence from Britain, India split along confessional lines, with Pakistan and Banglandesh appearing on the map. To date, India went to war in 1965 with Pakistan over Kashmir in the north, and with China over Aksai-Chin (a territory the size of Switzerland occupied by Chinese troops in 1962), as well as over Arunchal Pradesh (a Buddhist territory rich in forests and agricultural land).

The inconclusive conflict of 1962 ended with the two armies retreating behind the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which roughly follows the infamous MacMahon line. Since then, there have been incursions and so-called border violations in their thousands, as the old MacMahon line allowed for a 10 km “give-or-take” corridor the length of the entire border.

Relations between the two superpowers remained largely frozen until the eighties when both Deng Xiaoping and the Indian leadership realised that the two countries have to finalise their border disputes once and for all. Thus in 1993, the two sides agreed to adopt the CBM (Confidence Building Measures) agreement, which provided for non-aggression, notification of large troop movements and the establishment of a 10 km no-fly zone for military aircraft.

Negotiations between China and India continued, with the signing in 2005 of a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” by Wen Jiabao and Indian premier M. Sinh. The partnership is aimed at ensuring that border disputes are solved amiably and would not degenerate into a second border war between the two countries.

Latest developments

The neo-conservative Bush Jr. administration in Washington decided to befriend India and use it to contain China’s rise. It agreed to overlook India’s violation of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the US replaced India’s traditional ally, the defunct Soviet Union, as the country’s new strategic partner. According to Washington Times editorialists, India started to be groomed by the State Department as a “new Australia” in Asia, in spite of the Indian political leadership’s deep suspicion of the US – a 50-year ally of Pakistan.

In 2007, the US military’s involvement with India culminated with joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, in which Singapore, the Australian and Japanese navies also took part. In 2009, India acquired 3.5 billion dollars’ worth of arms from the US, greatly alarming China.

Beijing describes India’s new foreign policy as based on the principle of “befriending the far and attacking the near”. Since the 1980’s the Dalai Lama – the old CIA protege – was reactivated and encouraged to tour world capitals in support of a Tibet cause, as the 1914 border accord had been signed with a de facto Tibetan state that had never been recognised internationally and disappeared after a few years.

The Indian public is continuously bombarded with news about so-called Chinese violations of Indian borders and of a Chinese military build-up of the border zones. In fact, as the same Taylor Fravel of MIT points out, China has successfully concluded permanent border agreements with all its neighbours except India and Bhutan. Its upgrade of military facilities does not target India in particular, as it encompasses the full length of China’s borders.

The anti-Chinese rhetoric has recently culminated with an article published by Baharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defense Review, in which he predicted that by 2012 China will attack India over the disputed territories. The scare tactics might, however, have been employed by the defence establishment in order to obtain the funds needed to renew its antiquated equipment. Thus, on October 7, 2010, India has signed a pre-contract agreement with Russia for the supply of between 250 and 300 latest generation Sukhoi fighter jets at an estimated cost of some 30 billion dollars, or 100 million USD per jet. Some fighter jets were already dispatched close to Arunchal Pradesh and 100,000 mountain troops were also sent to the area.

Meanwhile, Indian military officials and foreign policy pundits are claiming that China has replaced Pakistan as India’s biggest threat. Tensions, however, are mitigated by the fact that bilateral trade between the two countries is booming. If in 1990 this was worth 270 million dollars, the figure has reached around 60 billion dollars in 2009-2010. Clearly, India’s politicians and business establishment have a strong vested interest in normalising relations with China, whose economy is 4 times larger than India’s and is growing at a faster pace.

The Obama administration has fortunately abandoned the Bush administration’s reliance on India as a centerpiece of the US’ geostrategic realignment in Asia. President Obama is on record for saying that China and not India is the US’ main partner in Asia, provided the country abides by its self-imposed “peaceful rise” strategy.

India and China, however, still have the largest unsolved border issue in the world, with the potential to degenerate into full-fledged war at any time. If one takes into account the fact that the two countries are the largest and most populous in Asia and that they are both economically strong and nuclearly armed, one could more easily realise why the resolution of the issue cannot be delayed much longer without enormous risks for peace in Asia. (sources: Hindustan Times, Pakistan Daily, Arunchal News, People’s Daily, WSJ, Newsweek, The Australian, Washington Times, Japan Times)