Subtelny's Imaginary Ukraine

 Orest Subtelny's efforts to present Ukrainian history as separate from Russia's were, sadly,  an exercise in futility.

Back in the 1970's, the West was mired in stagflation. By the end of the decade, however, a new Polish pope arrived in the Vatican and Margaret Thatcher took over as prime minister in the United Kingdom. To reverse the economic decline, a new doctrine - neoliberalism - was adopted, first in the countries of the Anglosphere and in subsequent years all over the Western world. The main tenet of the new economic philosophy consisted in the wholesale privatisation of state-owned enterprises, a measure deemed to make them leaner and more profitable. 

Moving forward to the 80's, the problem was that of finding new markets for the consumer goods that Western industries still produced in abundance. The natural choice was Central and Eastern Europe which, however, was still part of the Soviet sphere of influence. Taking advantage of a leadership vacuum until the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev at the helm in Moscow, the Vatican and the CIA fatally undermined the communist regime in Poland. The new Soviet leadership was caught - by the events which continued to unfold in Central Europe - in the middle of a series of economic and political reforms that ultimately failed. Accordingly, Gorbachev agreed to end the USSR's domination of Central and Eastern Europe, which culminated in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

While Western politicians were cultivating Gorbachev and his wife assiduously, behind closed doors the British and American services were busy plotting the demise of the USSR. Thus, in 1988 two books were published practically simultaneously, authored by Jacques Rupnik, a Czech, and a Ukrainian-American historian, Orest Subtelny. 

Rupnik's book, The Other Europe, was aiming to sell in the West the necessity of doing away with the Iron Curtain, and the acceptance of Soviet satellite countries from Central and Eastern Europe as full members in the European family of nations.

Subtelny's book, Ukraine: A History, was published in an effort to offer Ukrainians - who never had a history separate from that of the Russian or Soviet states - a history of their own. The objective was clearly geopolitical.The book was aimed squarely at Moscow's leadership over the Ukrainian territory.

For British and American intelligence officials, Ukraine was considered "the linchpin of the Soviet Union", which would collapse without it. This is the reason why Subtelny's history book was the main propaganda tool in these efforts, although from a scientific point of view its value is highly questionable. Indeed, no other nation in Europe was born only on the basis of two disparate events, a brief independence spell in 1919 and the Stalin-engineered Holodomor (the famine that affected Ukraine between 1932-1933). The book was nevertheless hailed as the best history of Ukraine and was published in Ukrainian as early as 1990, before the country declared independence from the USSR (August 24, 1991).

For the neutral historian, the difficulty of presenting Ukrainian history as separate from that of Russia is simply enormous. For centuries, Ukraine was part of the Russian state and later of the Soviet Union. Ukrainians were not in any way disadvantaged by their association with the Russian state, on the contrary. Quite a few Ukrainians achieved positions of great responsibility within Russia and subsequently in the Soviet Union, one of their own, Nikita Khrushchev, becoming head of state. A history like Subtelny's, therefore, could only artificially claim that Ukrainians developed a separate national consciousness and that they would be better off founding a state of their own, to be integrated within the West. 

And herein lies the key as to why Subtelny's book was commissioned, written and aggressively promoted in the first place. The 130 million inhabitants of Central and Eastern European countries, former Soviet satellites, had become attractive enough for Western economic interests, but the addition of another 44 million Ukrainians and a very large territory would be even better. At any rate, for those involved in the planning, if this artificial nationhood were to take off, and it would then lead to the dissolution of the USSR, so much the better.

In later years, Subtelny himself became very unhappy with the nation-building efforts his history book helped ignite in Ukraine. He died in 2016, disillusioned with the way things turned out in the end. His is a cautionary tale for all other historians eager for recognition who agree to participate in secret service-sponsored nation-building efforts in foreign lands, allowing for their considerable skill and scholarship to be misused in this way.

Epilogue to the End of the USSR

The events unfolding in Ukraine are the final act in the disintegration of the Soviet Union which began peacefully, Czech-style, in 1991 and is unfortunately about to end in bloodshed, Yugoslavian-style, now. This time, however, the part played by Milosevic in Belgrade is being emulated by Zelensky in Kiev with the West backing the wrong side in this conflict.

Astute and knowledgeable observers of European affairs may have noticed for a few decades now that European Slavs do not always know how to live peacefully together in the same country.

During the nineties we witnessed the implosion of two Slav states, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The differences between Czechs and Slovaks or between Croatians and Serbs were in fact minor and were related to different dialects, in some cases to religion or belonging to different political blocks before unification. To give but one example, while Serbs were until the end of the 19th century part of the Ottoman empire, the Croatians lived in the Austro-Hungarian empire. (In 2006, even Serbia and Montenegro dissolved their union dating back to the 19th century)

The disintegration of Yugoslavia took a full 8 years to complete, between 1991-1999, and was marked by wars between the Serbs and the Croats, the Serbs and the Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Kossovars. The wars ended only after NATO took the decision to bomb Serbia and destroy critical infrastructure in 1999.

For most European nations of mixed ethnic backgrounds, like Belgium or Switzerland, such differences did not prevent them from building well-managed states, which outlasted cataclysmic events like the two world wars, and are still around today. Belgium, for example, separated in 1830 from the more powerful Dutch state and was subject to military aggression. The military aggression against Belgium was stopped in its tracks by the London Conference of the Great Powers, when its independence and neutrality were affirmed and recognised.

To the East of the continent, Romania provides another example of a country made up of territories of the former Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, but which displays remarkable national unity and a high degree of tolerance towards the Hungarian minority on its territory. 

In the beginning, the 1991  dissolution of the USSR happened peacefully . The Soviet empire stands as a shining example of a multinational state that folded without igniting a war or provoking ethnic violence. This situation lasted until 2014, when American neoconservatives decided to play nation-builders in Ukraine. 

The 2014 change in government in Kiev and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea marked the beginning of an armed struggle between the Russophones living in the Donbas and the Ukrainian army. After another 8 years of skirmishes which made 14,000 victims, as documented by the OSCE, Russia has decided to intervene militarily a few days ago and to start the aerial bombing of the main Kiev military installations. Unlike the mighty NATO intervention in Serbia in 1999 - which shied away from putting boots on the ground - the Russian army entered Ukraine in force. Also, whilst NATO's actions in Serbia were questionable from an international law point of view, Russia is trying to put order in its own neighbourhood.

The events unfolding over the past few days in Ukraine and Russia's military intervention  are, unfortunately, badly distorted by Western media and diplomats. The most disgusting aspect of the current events is the Western leadership's hypocritical reaction to them. Thus, while the West deplored the fate of a few hundred Kosovar victims and was quick enough to bomb the Milosevic regime out of existence, the thousands of victims and millions of refugees from the Donbas have not registered at all on its radars. In fact, the condemnation of the Russian intervention has a lot to do with the West's irrational and unjustifiable dislike of Russia as a state and of Putin as its leader.

What we are in fact witnessing now is the epilogue of the USSR's 1991 disintegration, which left Russian-speaking populations in countries like Georgia or Ukraine at the mercy of unscrupulous political leaders, like Shakashvili or Zelensky, and their external backers, especially in the US. Both these leaders have done their utmost to drag the entire Western alliance into a much bigger military conflict with Russia, in an eerily similar manner in which the Serbs had done in 1914. If ultimately successful, such efforts would have surely degenerated into a nuclear war.

Treating the current events in Ukraine as similar to the final disintegration of Yugoslavia, however, can go a long way towards preventing Western officials from making fools of themselves out of sheer lack of understanding of the political culture of Slavic nations and of their propensity to use violence against other Slavs who happen not to share their religion or language, as Kiev's treatment of the Russophones in the Donbas has shown. 

Vladimir Putin's Take on Russian History

 

British historian Dominic Sandbrook tries to explain to Western audiences bored with the study of history that for the nations of Eastern Europe history matters enormously.

He claims that Vladimir Putin is by no means the successor of Stalin - who was Georgian - but that he considers himself as a successor at the helm of the Russian state built by Peter the Great . Thus, in a historical essay published on the website of the Russian presidency, Vladimir Putin states unequivocally that the Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians all have the same origin and hail from the Ancient Rus, even if throughout history there have been divisions between them.

Romanians can very well relate to this approach to Russian history. For at least two centuries, all Romanian intellectuals have stated with one voice that Moldovans, Wallachians and Transylvanians "all hail from Rome", that they belong to the same people, sharing a common origin and language. Putin says exactly the same thing about Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, and I - as an historian - don't think he is wrong .

In other words, Putin is not a kind of post-Soviet leader like Nazarbayev, for example, eager to rebuild the USSR, as the recent neocon campaign in the US would have us believe. No, he is a nationalist leader and is mainly interested in restoring unity to the Russian world. That's why I don't think Putin is a danger to the former Soviet satellites, like  Romania . Bringing the USSR back to life in a  new form is not on the Kremlin's geopolitical agenda.

What is happening now with regard to Ukraine is therefore the consequence of Putin's nationalist approach to the history of Russia, which in his view involves a multidimensional effort aimed at restoring in time the economic and political unity of the Russian world, in the sense that it was first achieved  by Peter the Great in the 18th century.

When History repeats itself as a Farce

 

On the 20th of October the US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin visited Bucharest, where he met with President Iohannis and Defence Minister Ciuca. A day later, President Iohannis designated Ciuca as the next Prime Minister of Romania, to replace the disgraced Vasile Citu. 

At first, General Ciuca sought a parliamentary vote of confidence in a PNL minority government and failed. For his second attempt, President Iohannis enlisted the help of Romania's social democratic party (PSD), which he brought - against the wishes of many Liberal party members - into a coalition with the ruling Liberals, not before destroying the former coalition between the Liberals and a smaller centre-right party, USR Plus.

Iohannis - who for years has campaigned and got re-elected as president on an anti-PSD platform (which was regularly labelled by him as the "red plague") - has thus stunned most members of his Liberal party, as well as the country's leading writers and artists who had hitherto supported his policies and presidential bids. Moreover, he single-handedly imposed Citu as the new president of the Liberal party and provoked the expulsion of the incumbent party president, former PM Ludovic Orban, who was against undoing the coalition with USR Plus. (To fully understand the character of Iohannis, it's worth mentioning the fact that it was Ludovic Orban who had convinced his party members in 2014 to accept Iohannis and to support his presidential bid.)

Lloyd Austin came to Bucharest in the middle of the crisis provoked by the political clumsiness of the Romanian president. In all probability, he was the one who advised Iohannis to promote general Ciuca to the post of Romanian PM, the first general to lead the government since the end of WWII.

A historical retrospective is in order here. In 1940, Hitler was preparing the invasion of the USSR and badly needed Romania's oil reserves and military help. As a result, general Ion Antonescu was the prime minister selected to lead Romania during the war, with the support of Nazi Germany. The tragedy of Romania after 1945 sprung from the nefarious alliance concluded by Antonescu with Hitler, which ended up in the occupation of the country by the victorious Red Army.

As Marx was fond of reminding his readers, history can only be repeated twice: first as a tragedy, and the second time as a farce. 

To put things into perspective, it is fair to say that Putin is nowhere near as fierce an enemy of the West as Stalin once was. Lloyd Austin's efforts to prepare the Eastern flank of NATO for a Russian invasion of Ukraine are largely misguided. What's more, the American Secretary of Defence is guilty of gross interference in Romania's internal political affairs and of playing an identical role in Romanian eyes to that of Hitler in 1940. In other words, Lloyd Austin behaved in Bucharest like a Hitler 2.0 of sorts, provoking the ire of the Romanian intellectual and artistic elites who feel they're witnessing a grotesque political farce all over again.

The Eurasian Union: Two Competing Geopolitical Visions

 March 21, 2012

The implosion of the Soviet Union has in many ways adversely affected the stability of the Central Asian republics like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. Since 1991, a loose alliance of 11 former Soviet republics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), was formed in order to preserve, at least in part, the Soviet-era heritage in regional economic integration.

The geopolitical competition for influence in Central Asia has ceased to be a Russia-only affair, however. China is rapidly becoming a big player in the energy sweepstakes, if its direct dealings with Turkmenistan and others are any guide. Closer to Europe, Turkey has also been willing to take the lead in promoting Eurasian integration. Thus, on the 5th of February 2010, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu has stated during a business conference that “there is a need to embark on a new vision in order to have the Eurasia region regain its historical importance”. Assembling the five “stans” into an Eurasian common structure would, in Davutoglu’s view, be useful to establish “a link between energy-supplying countries and energy-receiving countries”.

Turkey’s ability to foster Eurasian regional integration is based on common cultural and religious roots of the inhabitants of the Central Asian republics. To further its diplomatic aims, Turkey has founded TURKSOY in 1993 in Alma Aty (Kazakhstan), as an international organisation for the promotion of Turkish culture abroad.

As the Arab revolutions have forced Turkey’s diplomats to put the Eurasian project on the back-burner, the opportunity has astutely been seized by Vladimir Putin. In an article entitled “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making” published by Izvestia on the 4th of October 2011, Vladimir Putin has outlined his vision for the creation of an Eurasian Union larger in size than the European Union. Putin argues that the objective is to build “a new, strong, supranational union that could become one of the poles of the modern world, and could play the role of an effective bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region”.

His proposed union would be much more than a mere customs union and would include such common institutions as an Eurasian Commission, similar to the one in Brussels, an Eurasian parliament, as well as an Eurasian common currency. To foster regional integration, the Eurasian union “should be built on the inheritance of the Soviet Union: infrastructure, a developed system of regional production specialisation, and a common space of language, science and culture” (V.Putin).

Putin claims that the impetus for the regional integration plans was provided by the financial crisis – a reason invoked by the Chinese, as well, in plans to build their own trade bloc together with the ASEAN countries.

According to Mars Sariev, a Kyrgyz political scientist, Putin and the Russian foreign policy elite have had little choice but to come up with a blueprint for integrating the former Soviet republics into a regional bloc. The alternative, he claims, would be for Russia to become a mere supplier of raw materials for the EU and China. Recently, during an Eurasian Economic Community summit involving Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, their leaders have decided to postpone the creation of the Eurasian Union until 2015. Curiously enough, the project’s most vocal opponent was Belarus’ president Lukashenko, although Ukraine’s president Yanukovich, whose country was present at the summit as an observer, also expressed serious reservations regarding Putin’s plans.

Professor Gerhard Simon of the University of Cologne assesses the chances of success for the proposed Eurasian Union project as “slim to none”. The president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, considers the project as being the blueprint for “a new Soviet Union”, a charge vehemently denied in his Izvestia article by Vladimir Putin.

The biggest misgivings concerning the Eurasian project come from countries like Azerbaijan and Georgia, which together with Turkey have already formed a geopolitical team that benefits from US assistance. Both countries experience ethnic turmoil, Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and Georgia in South Ossetia. Azerbaijan would rather export its oil and gas directly to Europe, through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. SOCAR, the Azeri state oil company has invested 1 billion US dollars in Georgia and controls 80 percent of the latter’s fuel stations. Georgia, meanwhile, is strongly courting NATO and EU membership and is complaining about Brussels’ foot-dragging regarding its accession hopes.

To be sure, the geopolitical competition between Turkey and Russia for the creation of an Eurasian union is heating up. Whilst it is hard to envisage an Eurasian union built around Russia, given its enormous size and colonial record, Turkey’s recent policy paralysis does not qualify it as a strong regional leadership contender, either. (sources: EurActiv, Voice of America News, Deutsche Welle, The Atlantic, Izvestia, Today’s Zaman, www.TurkishCentralNews.com)

EU Decision-making: Going the Wrong Way About It

 

January 31, 2012

We’re heading towards a Soviet-style union run by a Politburo made up of national political leaders uninterested in consulting the European Parliament on important decisions affecting our lives.

Whilst in Brussels where the EU heads of government were busily hammering out measures aimed at solving the euro-crisis, Martin Schulz held his first speech as President of the European Parliament. He rightfully incriminated the cumbersome and un-democratic way EU political leaders make decisions bearing on the future of Europe’s almost half a billion citizens. To be sure, the EU is not a fully functioning union yet and the fiscal arrangements concluded on January 30th only serve to reinforce this.

As Martin Schulz has complained, the European Parliament is rarely consulted before a vital, Europe-wide decision is made. Indeed, it seems national leaders act as a veritable Soviet-style Politburo. The German chancellor, like Russia’s leaders had within the Soviet federation, is increasingly able to railroad the other national leaders into agreeing to policies that will ultimately bring about… the unravelling of this union, as well. We have been used to comparing Germany to the other exporting powerhouse, China. So why compare it to Russia now? To their credit, the Chinese are pouring tens of billions of dollars into infrastructure projects within their ASEAN neighbourhood every year, sometimes without even being asked. Moreover, they are buying hundreds of billions of dollars worth of US treasury bonds, only to keep their business partner afloat and able to buy Chinese goods. Would anyone see the Germans doing likewise ? Not unless they really had to, and then on condition they get to take over the fiscal management of the country in need of assistance.

Look no further than the adoption of the so-called «golden rule», as a panacea for solving the sovereign debt crisis and so much more (!). Unfortunately, however, most of the countries that were forced to adopt austerity measures aimed at balancing their budgets have been beset by huge social turmoil, du jamais-vu in post-war Europe. To the current leaders who met in Brussels on Monday, warnings constantly issued by Nobel prize laureates like Joseph Stiglitz or leading economists like Martin Feldstein seem to matter little, if at all. If the trend continues, I sincerely wonder who is going to be left with enough funds to buy German cars and German machine tools around here… As Christine Lagarde has courteously reminded her German hosts recently, for every surplus country like Germany, there have to be a number of deficit countries left, in order to absorb its exports. There’s simply no other way about it. This is why the «golden rule» can only have a boomerang effect on the German economy, but to people affected by political myopia, that, of course, is no valid reason to desist.

And what if the European Parliament, since the spring of 2011, was in favour of the introduction of eurobonds? Nobody has invited its representatives to have a say at the summits where such decisions are taken. Let’s face it: for complex issues, inter-governmentalism as a decision-making mechanism has proven highly detrimental to the running of the Union’s affairs. More often than not, the Commission and the European Parliament look on as powerless spectators of the ongoing series of policy blunders which, instead of solving the crisis, aggravate it.

Whilst national governments are being constrained to stop much-needed investments in infrastructure and other projects, the European Commission is supposed to pick up the slack and spend some 82 billion euros on regional projects in order to kickstart growth. Now, if anyone believes that this sum is going to make a significant dent in the continent’s unemployment, good luck to them. Sure, as Martin Schulz has observed, the adoption of a 0.05% financial transactions tax would bolster the EU’s budget by 200 billion euros per year, but who listens to Euro-parliamentarians ? As in the illustrious Soviet example, apparently nobody…

Author : Spotlight on Geopolitics
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External Relations  , E.U., euro

Will the EU Outlast the Euro Crisis ?

 October 13, 2011

According to the laws of aerodynamics, the honey bee is too heavy and its wing shape cannot support it in the air. This, nevertheless, does not prevent it from flying and tirelessly collecting pollen every day, which is the essential raw ingredient in the production of honey.

The sovereign debt crisis has provided fodder to critics of the EU’s institutional arrangements, at home or abroad. According to them, the European project is about to implode. Why, George Soros even compared the situation to that of the defunct Soviet Union ! The euro is described as “the most dangerous currency in the world”(Der Spiegel), the lack of a central government in Brussels is given as a liability, the EU’s soft power approach to foreign policy is being dismissed as less than impressive. From Joschka Fischer to the parties of the Left, many believe that the moment has come to rebuild the Union into a federal superstate, with a central government, a treasury and uniform taxation laws. This overhaul from the ground up of the EU is supposed to solve, almost overnight, all the problems confronting member countries, regardless of gaps between their different levels of economic performance, productivity, labour laws or even attachment to common European values.

I have no way of knowing how many of my fellow commentators have paid 1,700 pounds sterling from their own pocket – as I have in 1997 – to attend international conferences on the monetary union, back when the euro was still a project. As the owner of a small FMCG import business based in Romania, I had considered it my duty to be among the first to learn what the project entailed. Naturally, I would have been happy to be able to use a single currency in order to reduce my transaction fees on every load of goods imported from the UK, and wrote so in a position paper I spread in London among the participants at the conference. During lunch, I was seated at the same table with Russian bankers and an Italian central banker. At the time, I routinely assumed that the Italians, like myself, were interested in learning more about the common currency project as observers, without however hoping to join it as members…

In 1997, I believed that the euro would include initially only EU members with solid finances, high productivity and strong economic performance. Alas, kingdoms like Denmark, Sweden or the UK refused to become part of it. Instead, who would have thought at the time that Mediterranean countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain or Italy would be included in the first wave ? This should have happened, in my view, a decade or two later, only after the euro had been tested by international markets and after southern countries would have significantly improved their economic performance, in a bid to qualify for membership. The fact that the euro’s introduction happened the way it did lends credibility to the theories according to which the planners knew about the flaws, but hoped to use an eventual future crisis to align the EU to the US federal model. Whilst by 1997 the need for another solid reserve currency was more than evident, it made little sense, if any, to draw so many EU members into the project at once, as it has now become clear to all.

And yet, the solutions to the current crisis – be it the shrinking of the euro or even the dismantling of the common currency area – would not, in my view, irreversibly damage the European Union. The proverbial prosperity and stability the continent enjoyed for the past sixty years would not be shattered because the planners went the wrong way about the euro. Both China and the United States, as well as Japan – not to mention weaker EU member states and surrounding neighbours – have become reliant to a high degree on the world’s equivalent of the honey bee, our very own EU. As much as we like to criticise it, or on occasion dismiss it as a cumbersome non-state actor, the European Union is here to stay, even if – and probably just because – it is not simply a version of American-type federalism on the European continent.

Author : Spotlight on Geopolitics
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E.U., Economy & Euro  , E.U., economics, euro