Two-speed Europe

 October 31, 2011

The decisions agreed upon by EU leaders during the 26th of October summit – the leveraging of EFSP, the “voluntary” 50 percent reduction of Greece’s debt, improved coordination of fiscal policies within the eurozone countries, the appointment of a super-commissioner with fiscal oversight responsibilities – have all been judged as steps in the right direction by the financial community. Stock markets have reacted positively and so have a few major rating agencies.

Less enchanted with the outcome are, however, the leaders of the ten EU countries which are not currently part of the eurozone. As a result, the summit was the scene of harsh verbal exchanges between David Cameron and the French president, for example, but tensions were equally evident among the Swedish and Romanian delegations.

The non-members of the eurozone feel that the Union is heading towards a two-speed Europe. In other words, its core is made up by the 17 eurozone member countries, headed by Germany and France, whilst the rest are relegated to the periphery, geographically as well as economically. The UK’s chief concern, as the leading financial centre of the Union, is the insistence of eurozone member countries on introducing a financial services tax which could cripple the activity of the City of London. Romania, on the other hand, has expressed reservations about the measure to recapitalise EU banks with large exposure to the Greek, Italian or Spanish debts. As most of its banks are foreign-owned, that might lead to a drastic reduction in lending to local companies. All the other leaders feel already excluded from the important decision-making process, which will take place in the first instance within the euro-club and only afterwards discussed with the rest of the EU’s political representatives.

The emergence of the two-speed Europe could have been avoided by the northern kingdoms if they had agreed to join the eurozone from day one. At the time, countries like the UK and Sweden, for example, sported healthy finances and a fiscal discipline which were in accordance with the criteria established at Maastricht. All is not lost, however. Membership of the eurozone is still open to them in the future, if only they could overcome their reluctance to join. The newer EU members, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and even Bulgaria are all making strenuous efforts to reduce their budget deficits, improve tax collection and prepare their economies for becoming full members of the eurozone in the years to come.

Viewed in this light, the existence of a eurozone core that could act as a catalyst for change upon the “periphery” is not altogether as negative a development as some EU political leaders wish to present it to their electorates. (sources: Der Spiegel, Reuters, Le Monde, The Economist, The Guardian)

The EU's crisis-busting projects

 October 23, 2011

On the 19th of October, the European Commission has announced in a press release that it will invest 31.7 billion euros into the transport infrastructure of member countries in need. Until now, as the document states, rail and road networks have been developed within the EU on a national basis. Opportunities for interconnectivity have thus been lost and that has severely restricted the free flow of goods and people across the continent.

Mediterranean countries such as Spain,for example, stand to benefit most from such investments. According to La Vanguardia, a rail link along the coast from the Franco-Spanish border to Algeciras in the south will finally be built in the next few years, at a cost of some 19 billion euros. The railway will bypass Madrid altogether. This development is also in line with the measures advocated in a recent Project Syndicate op-ed (“Mediterranean Reborn”) by Javier Solana. According to him, the building of new rail links connecting southern Europe with the centre of the continent will reduce costs as well as pollution levels and help rebalance the current trade flows from the Pacific region to Europe. Since northern European countries have far better-equipped harbour and rail networks than the south, merchandise from the Far East or India that comes via the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean currently bypasses ports like Venice, Marseilles or Barcelona in favour of Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Hamburg, even though the trip is three days longer.

The Commission will allocate money for the upgrading and linking of oil and gas pipelines, as well, in an effort to streamline energy distribution across the continent.

Taken together, these projects have the potential of creating tens of thousands of low-level jobs across southern Europe, at a time when unemployment in Spain, for example, has reached alarming levels. (sources: Presseurop, European Commission press release, La Vanguardia, Project Syndicate).

Will the EU Outlast the Euro Crisis ?

 October 13, 2011

According to the laws of aerodynamics, the honey bee is too heavy and its wing shape cannot support it in the air. This, nevertheless, does not prevent it from flying and tirelessly collecting pollen every day, which is the essential raw ingredient in the production of honey.

The sovereign debt crisis has provided fodder to critics of the EU’s institutional arrangements, at home or abroad. According to them, the European project is about to implode. Why, George Soros even compared the situation to that of the defunct Soviet Union ! The euro is described as “the most dangerous currency in the world”(Der Spiegel), the lack of a central government in Brussels is given as a liability, the EU’s soft power approach to foreign policy is being dismissed as less than impressive. From Joschka Fischer to the parties of the Left, many believe that the moment has come to rebuild the Union into a federal superstate, with a central government, a treasury and uniform taxation laws. This overhaul from the ground up of the EU is supposed to solve, almost overnight, all the problems confronting member countries, regardless of gaps between their different levels of economic performance, productivity, labour laws or even attachment to common European values.

I have no way of knowing how many of my fellow commentators have paid 1,700 pounds sterling from their own pocket – as I have in 1997 – to attend international conferences on the monetary union, back when the euro was still a project. As the owner of a small FMCG import business based in Romania, I had considered it my duty to be among the first to learn what the project entailed. Naturally, I would have been happy to be able to use a single currency in order to reduce my transaction fees on every load of goods imported from the UK, and wrote so in a position paper I spread in London among the participants at the conference. During lunch, I was seated at the same table with Russian bankers and an Italian central banker. At the time, I routinely assumed that the Italians, like myself, were interested in learning more about the common currency project as observers, without however hoping to join it as members…

In 1997, I believed that the euro would include initially only EU members with solid finances, high productivity and strong economic performance. Alas, kingdoms like Denmark, Sweden or the UK refused to become part of it. Instead, who would have thought at the time that Mediterranean countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain or Italy would be included in the first wave ? This should have happened, in my view, a decade or two later, only after the euro had been tested by international markets and after southern countries would have significantly improved their economic performance, in a bid to qualify for membership. The fact that the euro’s introduction happened the way it did lends credibility to the theories according to which the planners knew about the flaws, but hoped to use an eventual future crisis to align the EU to the US federal model. Whilst by 1997 the need for another solid reserve currency was more than evident, it made little sense, if any, to draw so many EU members into the project at once, as it has now become clear to all.

And yet, the solutions to the current crisis – be it the shrinking of the euro or even the dismantling of the common currency area – would not, in my view, irreversibly damage the European Union. The proverbial prosperity and stability the continent enjoyed for the past sixty years would not be shattered because the planners went the wrong way about the euro. Both China and the United States, as well as Japan – not to mention weaker EU member states and surrounding neighbours – have become reliant to a high degree on the world’s equivalent of the honey bee, our very own EU. As much as we like to criticise it, or on occasion dismiss it as a cumbersome non-state actor, the European Union is here to stay, even if – and probably just because – it is not simply a version of American-type federalism on the European continent.

Author : Spotlight on Geopolitics
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E.U., Economy & Euro  , E.U., economics, euro

"The Real Global Economy is Intact"

 October 9, 2011

In an unprecedented development, on the 8th of October the three most important business associations in Europe – the French MEDEF, the German BDI and the Italian Confindustria – have launched a joint appeal calling for a deepening of political and economic integration among EU member countries.

The business leaders signing the appeal are thus taking the lead for further EU integration from politicians- the traditional promoters of European unity up until now. In a desire to restore economic growth within the Union, the authors of the appeal consider that a new EU treaty should replace the current one. The work on the new treaty should start in parallel with current efforts to replace the European financial stability facility (EFSF) by 2013. It should provide for further political and fiscal integration, with a view to improve stability and growth, as envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. The aim of the proposal is to render the EU economically prosperous and politically strong, by improving the performance of all member countries.

The new permanent mechanism due to replace the EFSF by 2013 should, in the authors’ view, be an independent institution capable of assisting EU countries, subject to strict conditions. The competitiveness of EU economies would be improved by a thorough process of economic reforms, avoiding the piecemeal approach that has been the norm so far in countries from southern Europe.

By pointing out that the real world economy is actually intact, the business leaders are convinced that there is no reason to let it slide into another bout of recession, or worse, if only corrective action is taken by politicians in a timely and resolute fashion. Judging by the fact that unemployment in Germany dropped to 6,5 %, the lowest level since reunification, they might have a point (source: Reuters France).

Greek geo-economic agenda in shambles

 October 2, 2011

As a general rule, with the exception of Russia and China, few developed countries have a geo-economic agenda of their own. This, after all, is the task of multinational or global corporations. The latter can benefit from logistical state support, but to a much more limited extent than in the past.

The situation is somewhat different for weaker southern members of the EU, like Greece or Spain. The core businesses there have been known to act in concert and expand in geographical areas of the world in which competitive pressures are mitigated by the pre-existence of religious, cultural and/or historical ties. Thus, since the 1990’s, Spanish banking conglomerates and telecommunication operators have been aggressively pursuing an expansion strategy in Latin America, where a common language and former political ties has given them an edge over their North American counterparts.

Up until the debt crisis derailed the country, Greek businessmen were similarly following a geo-economic agenda in the Balkans, which enjoyed the full support of the Greek state, and even that of the Greek Orthodox Church. Accordingly, Greek expansion took place in weaker markets that were undercapitalised, new to competition rules and fairly corrupt. The target countries all happened to be Orthodox, as well, and Greek diplomacy has attempted over the past ten years to become this group’s spokesman and leader within the EU.

To be sure, the minuscule size of Greece’s home market had made such economic expansion plans imperative. Like Spain in Latin America, Greek banks and telecommunication operator OTE / Cosmote opened offices and acquired stakes in companies in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia or Albania. Until 2010, Piraeus, Alpha or the National Bank of Greece became household names in the Balkans, and attracted a large share of deposits in the region. Their market share increased steadily, sometimes at the expense of better-capitalised Central European competitors with similar expansion plans, notably from Austria. OTE’s purchase of Romtelecom in Romania, for example, and the expansion of Cosmote mobile phone operator could be considered a regional success story.

Alas, the Greek economic expansion bonanza came to an abrupt halt once the true situation of Greece’s state finances became known. It is not that the geo-economic strategy was wrong, or that Greek companies operating abroad were poorly managed. Nothing of the sort. Rather, their carefully laid out expansion plans were first torpedoed, and then thwarted, by the doings of their home government. In some respects, the dire situation of Greek businesses operating abroad is similar to that of profitable Japanese companies operating globally, whose credit rating, public image and economic performance started being affected, at the turn of the millennium, by the Japanese government’s huge sovereign debt, which now stands at 225 % of GDP. In an effort to escape being overtaxed by a Tokyo administration desperate for cash, companies like Toyota, Sony and others had at one point even considered shifting most taxable assets overseas.

Nowadays, most Greek banks operating in Romania, for example, are posting losses, as depositors are fleeing them for safer banking operators Although relatively small in size, Greek banks are considered by financial analysts as conservative and well-managed, but, at the same time, saddled with quite a big chunk of the country’s treasury bonds. In the months and years to come, this might lead to some bank failures, as a result of the Greek state’s inability to honour its debts. Lending to Greek businesses operating abroad has also diminished considerably, further jeopardizing Greece’s expansion strategy adopted some fifteen years ago. Thus, deleveraging in Greece will not only affect the country’s public servants, but also its business community with operations abroad.