The war in Ukraine is in many ways puzzling, not only for the average European but also for seasoned historians who have failed so far to recognise or admit to its nature. This is so because, living as we are in a post-Cold War world and with a distant Atlantic power acting as the military leader in Western Europe, the actual nature of this war has largely been hidden from sight.
As we all know, there are many types of wars. Hegemonic wars, like the ones France and Germany fought during the 19th and 20th centuries; straight wars of conquest involving the acquisition of real estate at the expense of one's neighbour, which was the main type of war during the Middle Ages; wars of extermination, such as the ones fought by the Americans against the indigenous Indians, or by the Spanish against the Incas; there are also civil wars, which are wars within the boundaries of one country which can provoke significant loss of human life, as it happened during the war of secession in the US during the 1860s. In Europe, we also experienced the ravages and devastation provoked by religious wars, which afflicted the continent for 30 years and ended with the Peace of Westphalia. Finally, there are small-scale wars such as border wars, which mainly involve countries in Asia and which do not represent a major threat for international peace.
The war in Ukraine is exceedingly rare and we can call it a Bismarckian-type war. Such a war takes place within a group of countries that do not only neighbour each other but also share the same culture or language and are part of the same ethnic group. The Germans experienced such a war between Prussia and Austria in 1866.
A strongly militaristic Prussian state, built around Berlin, wanted to eliminate a second pole of power within the German world, Catholic Austria, which was dividing the German world and was making it impossible for them to unite into a more powerful political unit. This situation led to the " German war of brothers", or Deutscher Bruderkrieg.
The political leader at the time was the well-known Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. He spilled German blood during his war against Austria, but succeeded in his drive to unite most Germans around Prussia and remained to this day one of the greatest political figures in German and European history. (His legacy in international affairs was the advice - unfortunately not followed by his successors - that in order to have peace in Europe, a "good treaty with Russia" was paramount).
Like today, Bismarck's war was fought after the European continent experienced a long period of peace which followed the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. The similarities do not end here. Prussia, like Russia, was no fan of liberal democracies, but rather an authoritarian state managed with an iron fist by its emperor and its chancellor. Like Russia in the nineties, Prussia had been affected by the 1848 revolutionary wave in Europe - similar to the 1989 revolutionary wave - which sought to bring to power liberal-minded governments on the whole continent and generally democratise European political life.
The Slav world also oscillates between two religious poles and two nations that would like to be considered as leaders. One is Russia, a militaristic Slavic "Prussia", which has weathered many national crises and defeated two major enemies in modern times (the French and the Germans).
The second is - since the election of Karol Wojtyla to the Papacy - Poland. Its contribution to bringing about the fall of communism during the eighties, the implosion of the USSR, and its accession to NATO have rather adversely affected the minds of Polish politicians. Their hope is that by initially building Ukraine up as a client-state which is to be ultimately led by the Catholic element in that country, they would in time be able to challenge Russia together, for the leadership position of the Slav world. This is the main reason why Poland, which is militarily weak, is the most strident advocate of NATO intervention on behalf of Ukraine. But not being able to fight the Russians by themselves, the Polish leaders believe they have the cunning to push the Alliance to fight the war with Russia for them.
Russia felt that its primacy within the Slav world was being challenged by the Poles, who enlisted not only Ukraine's help but that of the Czechs and Slovaks as well, and in the end was forced to initiate a Bismarckian-type war in order to quell such plans. The Russians correctly assumed that such inter-Slav rivalries were a godsend to the advancement of Washington's unilateralist agenda, and to the final triumph -via Russia's defeat- of the neocon unipolar world project with America on top.
The only major difference now compared to Bismarck's times, therefore, lies in the existence of an extra-European superpower, the US, who has tried hard over the last twenty years to remain the sole leader in world affairs after the disappearance of the bipolar world. Still, it would be hard to believe that Americans would risk an all-out nuclear war with Russia, which is one of the champions of a multipolar world, in order to enforce their claim. For all practical purposes, by assisting Ukraine in its fight against Russia, the US and the EU are playing the role France played in 1866 in supporting Austria diplomatically. That, to be sure, will not make Ukraine win this or any other war against Russia.
