A Possible Blueprint for Preserving Peace in Europe

 August 2, 2017

Remember Montesquieu and his “doux commerce” ? “L’effet naturel du commerce est de porter à la paix. Deux nations qui négocient ensemble, se rendent réciproquement dépendantes: si l’une a intérêt d’acheter, l’autre a intérêt de vendre; et toutes les unions sont fondées sur des besoins mutuelles. Mais si l’esprit de commerce unit les nations, il n’unit pas de même les particuliers.”

Over the past few hundred years, this belief has become an integral part of the liberal credo and it animates the economic thinking of globalists to this day. Alas, the promise of trade as a peace-promoting activity among nations has never been fulfilled to date. The recent adoption of additional sanctions against Russia by the US senate amply proves that geopolitical tensions among nations and blocks of nations can thwart the beneficial effects of trade among them. One of the problems is that Russia and the United States are essentially alike tradewise. Both countries rely heavily for their export earnings on commodities (oil & gas) and sales of military hardware to their allies…

In many ways, the European Union is caught in the current crossfire between the former cold war enemies. A new and more dangerous version of the first cold war between the Americans and the Russians has emerged, one that is commonly called cold war 2.0. It has occurred as a direct result of the relentless expansion of NATO eastwards since the turn of the millennium and it is now seriously affecting international trade.

Nevertheless, restoring peaceful relations between the EU, US and Russia is an essential precondition of resuming normal trade relationships. But how to achieve this?

First, the Western alliance should recognize that the presence of NATO in the countries bordering Russia is viewed in Moscow as a huge security threat. Thus, not only should its expansion into Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia be halted, but additional confidence-building steps should be undertaken in order to defuse the current tensions.

Second, the Baltic countries should themselves revert to a neutral status, even as they retain EU membership.

Third, a newly-formed neutral zone between NATO and Russia should be created. This would include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, whose security should be guaranteed by multilateral treaties between NATO powers and Russia.

Past experience has proven that in case of conflict, in all these countries with sizeable Russian minorities, their allegiance naturally tilts towards Moscow. This makes these states, at the best of times, unreliable NATO allies or candidates. Furthermore, history has also shown that states like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia achieve a relatively higher level of internal stability when led by pro-Russian leaders.

Putting a stop to NATO’s expansion and taking a step back from the Russian borders would restore peaceful relations with Russia and improve trade ties. Just as important, it would prove that NATO is not bent on expansion at the expense of trade, but stays true to its original mandate of preserving peace on the continent.

Three Seas or Five Seas Initiative ?

 July 6, 2017

Polish President Andrzej Duda’s Three Seas Initiative project is a logical outcome of the European Union’s eastward expansion since the turn of the millennium.

To observers in the former Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe, the expansion of the EU looks very much like a “drang nach Osten” affair minus the tanks, that is. Even the French regarded this group of countries as lands to be conquered economically. Pascal Lorot, for example, one of the co-founders of geoeconomics, even wrote a book on the subject suggestively titled “La conquête de l’Est”.

Truth be told, ex-Soviet satellite states which have adhered to the European Union since 2004 have quickly become second-class countries within it. This is, by-and-large, a development I fully expected. As the Nobel-prize winning Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal pointed out in the seventies, from the association of a group of rich countries with a group of developing or poor countries, the latter would end up as the losers.

At the time the membership of the EU was restricted to Western Europe and Germany, things had worked out rather smoothly. Most if not all of its members were economically developed, former imperial powers, institutionally compatible with each other.

The EU’s new entrants since 2004, on the other hand, have a shared history of anti-imperialist struggles in their quest for nationhood that sometimes go back centuries. Some, like Poland, had even suffered partitions at the hands of all neighbouring empires: Austria-Hungary, Prussia and Russia. The countries in this group see their economic development stifled by Brussels’ over-regulation, their national sovereignty infringed upon in ways they cannot accept, and their future within the Union as a bleak one. These are but a few reasons why a closer integration between countries like Czechia, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and ex-Yugoslav states makes much more sense now than it did in the inter-war period.

Still, in my view, Poland would be an unlikely nucleus for promoting closer economic, military and even political links between them. To be successful, the group has to shy away from including states like the Baltic republics, Ukraine or Moldova. The latter states have millions of Russians or Russian-speaking citizens within their borders and, short of resorting to Stalinist-era eviction solutions, these countries’ eventual adherence would prove poisonous to the entire group. Needless to say, Russia would strongly oppose the formation of such a group if the Polish-inspired drive to include the largely neutral countries on its border would somehow prevail.

And last but not least, Greece should also potentially be included as a member of the TSI, which would thus become FSI (Five Seas Initiative). Greece’s adherence would give the group increased international clout, an enviable geostrategic configuration and better access to the Mediterranean. As matters now stand, there is no love lost between the Greeks and the German-led EU officialdom.

In fact, the driver of such an integration project should be Romania, for strategic and historical reasons. The inter-war Romanian foreign minister N. Titulescu had succeeded in 1934 in merging the Little Entente (made up by Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) with the countries from the Balkan Pact, which included Greece and Bulgaria. He was also careful not to antagonize the USSR, with which he signed a non-aggression pact.

Tragically, however, at this point in time Romania is unable to play such an essential role. Practically all the politicians we inherited from Ceausescu’s dictatorship – and Iliescu’s “original democracy” experiment – lack decency, credibility, vision, solid qualifications and political skill. Most of them are an illustration of the sociological nightmare of the worst who get on top, which makes it very difficult for the country to solve its internal woes, let alone participate in such a demanding undertaking.

The support of the United States, although not necessarily a military one, is a prerequisite for the successful completion of any of the above projects. It is no accident that President Trump gets a better reception in Poland than, say, Germany or Britain. The United States have themselves appeared on the world map after a successful war of independence, fought against imperial Britain.

If successful, the efforts of Central and Eastern Europeans to closer integrate their economies and markets and to build the needed physical infrastructure would also benefit the European continent as a whole.

Should the EU Agree to the Partition of Libya ?

 April 13, 2017

News has it that White House foreign policy aides are toying with the idea of partitioning Libya in three, roughly copying the Ottoman Empire’s former administrative entities in the region. As the “America First” political philosophy seems to have lost its appeal for the Trump team’s policymakers, there is now a flurry of initiatives on the foreign policy front. Needless to say, most such initiatives are misguided and, according to French and American experts, the grand strategy is not even decided upon in Washington, but in Israel.

The idea of partitioning Libya is yet another example of an amateurish approach to international relations which does not bode well, either for Libya or for its neighbour across the Mediterranean, the EU.

It would be useful at this point to remind readers that for at least 50 years before the September 11 attack, North Africa’s Maghreb had been the special responsibility of European powers, especially France, whereas the problems of the Middle East had for obvious reasons, for better or for worse, been handled by the United States. Since the start of GW. Bush’s “war on terror” however, the Americans have decided to enlarge their footprint in the Arab world. Consequently, a new strategic region was created to that end, commonly known as MENA (Middle East + North Africa). The Pentagon’s Africa command started to interfere in the way Maghreb countries were being run, the plan to partition Libya being only the culmination of such meddling.

European foreign policy experts and political representatives should, however, insist on adopting statecraft solutions for Tunisia, Libya and Algeria that are consistent with the region’s past and options for the future without any interference from America’s foreign policy operatives or from the Pentagon. Failing that, this region of the Arab world which has been reasonably peaceful until recently risks being engulfed in the same intractable conflicts that have characterised American leadership in the Middle East.

The Transatlantic "War of Fines"

 September 23, 2016

I’m not going to write about Bratislava’s informal September summit, for nothing of substance regarding the future of the Union has been decided there. Fact is, EU political leaders have delayed important decisions for the spring of 2017, after the results of the American elections are in.

Why does the next American president matter ? For a start, if Trump wins in November he will try to make good of the promise to squeeze more money for NATO from rich EU member states. If H. Clinton gets into the White House, pressure to do more for the common defence of the continent will somewhat be diminished and global elites from both sides of the Atlantic will get a powerful ally in Washington.

As matters now stand, transatlantic relations are deteriorating at a rapid pace. Indeed, for a few months now the “war of fines” has been well and truly underway. The EU has slapped a 13 billion-euro fine on Apple, the US’ best-performing corporation. The US retaliated with a 14 billion-dollar fine on Deutsche Bank, which – if enforced – could trigger a collapse of the entire German banking system and a full-fledged banking crisis within the EU. A few months prior to this the US had fined Volkswagen, the EU’s largest car manufacturer, 15 billion dollars. All these come on top of BNP Paribas’ 9 billion-euro fine from 2014, one of the largest ever applied to a bank outside the US.

The amount of money collected in fines by the US government is a clear indication that Uncle Sam has his coffers empty and finds it very hard to continue to provide adequate funding for Europe’s defence via NATO. The realisation of this fact might have prompted Jean-Claude Juncker to ask for the creation of an European army, albeit at the wrong time in the EU’s history.

In truth, the EU is able to provide for its own defence. The size of its member states’ armies combined, their air forces and navies could successfully deter would-be aggressors. Juncker, however, is the wrong person to undertake such a project, simply because he is a federalist. The EU does not need an “European army” as such, but rather a common NATO-like command structure in Brussels (or elsewhere) that could coordinate the militaries of member states in the event of a major conflict. That’s all.

Naturally, the new structure will in time replace NATO as a collective defence organisation and all member states will need to agree to higher levels of defence spending than it has been the case for the past sixty years. A common defence policy and collective security structures will not, however, alleviate the EU’s major crises, such as economic stagnation and migration. For those problems to be solved, the EU has to rid itself first of austeritarians and federalist-minded political leaders, who are chiefly responsible for the predicament the Union is currently in.

Brexit and a Two-Union Europe

Because of the shock of Brexit, one may be forgiven for overlooking the fact that this week could rightfully be called “the week of trade bloc summits”.

In Europe, the 27 remaining leaders of the EU have gathered for two days in Brussels to adopt a common position concerning the upcoming withdrawal of Great Britain from the union.

On the North American continent, President Obama has met with his Canadian and Mexican counterparts in a last-ditch attempt to safeguard NAFTA against the relentless attacks it is facing from the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump.

Last but not least, the leaders of the Pacific Alliance – the newest Latin American trade bloc made up of Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico – have held a two-day summit of their own to further cooperation in the areas of trade and investment.

The most important summit is by far the one which took place in Brussels, where political leaders were trying hard to reach a common position concerning the terms under which would take place the departure of Britain from the bloc. The initial anger generated by Brexit is slowly giving way to the realisation that the very existence of the world’s oldest trade bloc is now under threat.

With the future of the Union in doubt, federalization plans sold to the European public under the guise of an “ever-closer union” were stopped in their tracks by British voters. The project of a “United States of Europe” – as initially conceived by the CIA in the ‘fifties and advanced by stealth by like-minded European politicians over the span of decades – will in all likelihood have to be abandoned for good.

In order for readers to grasp the folly of such a project, let’s assume that the leaders of NAFTA decided to launch a trade bloc conceived only as a stepping stone to full monetary, fiscal and ultimately political union between the US, Mexico and Canada. To push our comparison further, let’s also imagine that the initial nucleus of NAFTA countries started expanding to Central and South America with the aim of eventually becoming a pan-American economic and political bloc dominating the entire Western hemisphere.

The Germans are currently trying to convince British conservative politicians that once outside the EU, the UK should adopt the Norwegian model. In other words, a country like Britain with a population of some 65 million and a 3-trillion dollar GDP is supposed to be treated like the small members of the European Economic Area (EEA), the latter of which comprises, beside Norway, geopolitically insignificant states like Liechtenstein, Andorra or San Marino.

So far, British Brexiters have called for informal negotiations with Brussels before invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. What in fact they should be doing is having informal talks with the leaders of like-minded EU states that are most likely to follow Britain’s lead. Once these negotiations are concluded, the formation of a brand new, competing trade bloc should be announced to the European public.

The obvious candidates for such a trade bloc would first and foremost be the Nordic kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark, with a combined population of 15 million and an aggregate GDP of some 850 billion USD. The second group that could be persuaded to join would be the Visegrad-4, made up of Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. The combined population of the latter is about 65 million, with an aggregate GDP of 1.9 trillion USD.

Together with Britain, the new trade bloc would thus have a total population of 145 million and an aggregate GDP of close to 6 trillion USD. It would be sure to have a much better bargaining position than the UK all by itself in negotiating trade agreements with what is going to be left of the European Union. This is in fact exactly what is happening on the Latin American continent, where the 5 year-old Pacific Alliance co-exists side by side with Mercosur, the older trade bloc which comprises the bulk of the countries in the region.

Our continent could certainly accommodate a two-union Europe and two competing trade blocs that could only improve the overall economic performance of both. With political integration now behind them, the remaining members of the EU could themselves start to concentrate their efforts more on improving trade and investment and less on geographic expansion.

Secret History of the EU Project

 June 10, 2016

Pew research data released a few days ago indicates a growing dissatisfaction with the EU even in countries like France and the Netherlands, founding members of the Union.

It would be easy, of course, to blame the spread of euroscepticism on Brexit, on the 2008 financial debacle or last year’s migration crisis. In fact, as I will attempt to demonstrate further, it is the design flaws inherent in the European project that now undermine its survival.

This project – involving “an ever-closer union” of European nations – originated on the other side of the Atlantic and had started as a covert operation of the then newly-formed CIA. These essential details were hidden from the public for decades. Even I, as an historian, was made aware of them thanks to the interventions on French TV of Mrs. Marie-France Garaud, the eminence grise of presidents De Gaulle, Pompidou and Chirac.

Recently declassified CIA-OSS archives also prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that men whom we have considered for years to be the EU’s founding fathers (Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and so on) were in fact paid to impose the CIA’s European project on an unsuspecting public opinion.

The CIA’s project was chiefly inspired by former OSS boss “Wild Bill” Donovan and by John Foster Dulles, former CIA director. Together with a small group of other lawyers, they elaborated the mad project of an “United States of Europe”. It was supposed to be realized in stages, by stealth and without European nations being fully informed about the ultimate shape or objectives of the EU institutions created in the mid-fifties.

Its original design flaws reflected the founders’ lack of grasp of European history, geography and geopolitics. Donovan and Dulles, steeped in European clandestine operations during WWII instead, had also developed an unhealthy admiration for existing Nazi blueprints to unite the continent’s countries and/or of Nazi high-ranking officials like Walther Funk. Their ideas by and large were incorporated into the CIA project, with the consequences only now made apparent by the financial and sovereign debt crises of the past decade.

However, had the initiators of the CIA project taken into consideration their own, American geopolitical scholarship concerning the organization of Europe after the war, Germany would have never been included into NATO but had been kept neutral instead, possibly undivided and under military occupation. Nicholas Spykman, the founder of American geopolitics, writing in 1941 considered that:

 

“Any proposal for the unification of Europe would tend to put them in a subordinate position to Germany (regardless of the legal provisions of the arrangement), since Germany, unless broken up into fragments, will still be the biggest nation on the continent. It is hardly conceivable that countries now fighting for their freedom would turn around and voluntarily submit to any such arrangement. It is equally improbable that the United States, after having made such tremendous sacrifices to help free these countries from the German yoke, would consent to the restoration of German domination.” (Nicholas Spykman,“The Geography of the Peace”, 1944)

 

 

 

Today when we look back at the crucial 1947-1957 decade, we can start to understand why the EU Commission and institutions are manned by an opaque bureaucracy unresponsive to public scrutiny, which is hell-bent on advancing the agenda of global corporations at the expense of the European citizen. Being a covert project inspired and financed by the CIA, the EU is indeed unable to fulfil the aspirations for progress of the European nations, although for a few decades it has seemed to function in that sense.

Towards the end, however, the central tenets of the project – the creation of the United States of Europe, Brussels’ centrally-planned economic and fiscal management, the common currency – became the foremost priorities of the subservient EU bureaucracy and of some EU political leaders alike. But this was also the point where European nations could not continue to support the project and started having serious doubts about the whole construction.

In hindsight, after two devastating world wars, the creation of NATO and the Marshall Plan would have been sufficient to keep the peace on the continent and return it to prosperity. The CIA on the other hand, which during the same period also financed the creation of the Bilderberg club, wanted to make sure that American multinationals and later global corporations can fully profit from European reconstruction and the accompanying economic development. Hence the adoption of an European union project and the creation of European institutions which were from the outset under the influence or management of people vetted and approved by the CIA/Bilderberg bosses.

The un-European nature of the entire EU project is its major flaw, although there are others, as well. No such project originating in the New World – even if elaborated with the best of intentions (which of course is not the case) – could ever be expected to work for long on the old continent. And vice-versa.

The EU’s apparent fleeting success had more to do with European reconstruction efforts and with the ubiquitous desire for peace after the two devastating wars. During the past two decades, unfortunately, CIA-sponsored politicians and intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic have overplayed their hand and the entire edifice is crumbling as a result. While it is hard to gauge right now what alternative structures and arrangements will ultimately replace the EU, what’s for certain is that European nations should never again go to war with each other or allow outside powers and institutions to make vital decisions on their behalf concerning their collective future.

NATO and the Baltics' Geopolitical Predicament

May 6, 2016

During the 90’s, the uncontested dean of American diplomacy, the late George Kennan, fulminated against NATO’s expansion eastwards, which he considered both unnecessary and potentially dangerous for the security of the United States. The Clinton and Bush administrations did not heed sound professional advice and now the Baltics’ inclusion into NATO is creating major headaches for the alliance’s military planners.

The planned deployment of a few NATO battalions in the Baltics has already irked the Russian military, who decided to deploy three divisions in order to counter the perceived danger on their northwestern border. Most Western military analysts have recently highlighted the fact that NATO is in no position to really protect Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in case the Russians do decide to attack, which they obviously do not intend to at this point in time.

Objectively speaking, small coastal states – like the Baltics – cannot be defended indefinitely against a much more powerful neighbour in search of access to the sea. Here is what the founder of American geopolitics, Nicholas Spykman, had to say in 1938 about it :

“The fate of the newly-created coastal states (…), the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is still to be determined, but to the geographer they appear as distinct anachronisms in the evolution of geographic state types, and it is hard for any student of history to study a map of Europe without a strong conviction that Russia will some day force her way to the Baltic and swallow them a second time” (“Geography and Foreign Policy II”, pp.219-220)

The size and geographical location of the Baltics, therefore, will render their defense against Russia useless in the long run. This does not mean that Vladimir Putin – or even his successor in the Kremlin – has any current invasion plans concerning these three republics. NATO military planners, however, are duty-bound to take these geopolitical realities into consideration and avoid the risk of exposing the alliance to military conflict with Russia.

Granted, over the past few decades Western politicians have chosen to ignore solid geopolitical advice and to act in the name of certain ideals that are at odds with geography and sound foreign policy principles. This ignorance of geopolitics has been the source of many a policy error in Europe and the Middle East, to mention but two geographical regions currently in turmoil.

The upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa and the shaky internal situation in Turkey, on the other hand, mean that the United States – and the West generally – needs Russia’s cooperation more than it ever did in the past. Accordingly, by making an unnecessary troop deployment decision in the Baltics, NATO risks being embroiled in facing alone the Islamist threat in the Middle East and possibly even the unraveling of the political order in Turkey. As matters currently stand, the president of Turkey has already proven his willingness to stoke up an open military conflict with Russia, which of course his country cannot hope to win.

Both the small Baltic republics and Turkey, therefore, have the potential to drag the other NATO members into direct confrontation with the Russian army, a development that no NATO commander seriously contemplates though. Still, the ugly European experience during WWI illustrates the fact that small countries, like the Baltic republics, or desperate political leaders like Erdogan are quite able to ignite a generalized military conflict, paid for with the lives of their much larger and peaceful neighbours that can be induced to sleepwalk their way into such a conflict.

Consequently, the political leaders of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania should be well advised by NATO’s major military powers to tone down their anti-Russian rhetoric and try to find ways to cohabitate peacefully with their neighbour. ( Incidentally, this is the same type of advice I have given in 2008 to the Estonian Ambassador to France during a seminar on these matters that took place at Sciences po in Toulouse).

As for Turkey, the NATO high command should make it clear to the country’s military that shooting down Russian aircraft for minor violations of the country’s airspace will not constitute the casus belli that could automatically trigger the full involvement of NATO into conflict, as stipulated by Article 5 of the alliance’s treaty. To be sure, this provision in the treaty is activated only when one of NATO’s member states is subject to fully fledged armed intervention by a hostile power.