The Migrant Crisis and EU Border Fences

 September 25, 2015

A few days ago while seeing the hundreds of refugees from the Middle East flock on Greek ferries, buses, taxis and trains in their drive north to the Macedonian border, I recalled a 20-page seminar paper I was required to write on the question of frontiers at Sciences po Toulouse.

The year was 2010, just one year before the start of the Arab revolutions in Maghreb, Egypt and the Middle East.

After briefly outlining the evolution of the European concept of frontier – the frontier as a zone like in the middle ages, or the frontier as a line like in our times – I dealt, as requested, with the question of human trafficking, illegal immigration and the options available for securing the EU’s external borders.

During the seventies I had completed my military training as a border guard patrolling Romania’s eastern frontier with what was then the Soviet Union. The reserve officers’ school provided me and my colleagues with the essential legal and logistical knowledge employed at the time to secure the country’s borders. That type of specialized knowledge proved of great assistance in 2010 for completing my assignment at Sciences po. The conclusion of my paper would not please many European policymakers, because it stated in no uncertain terms that the European efforts to make the continent’s borders impenetrable were probably doomed to fail and that a host of other solutions had to be considered in order to address the problems of smuggling, trafficking and illegal immigration.

Still, European politicians from Hungary to Ukraine or Estonia wrongly believe that a frontier can be secured by erecting fences and they are even willing to spend large amounts of cash to do so. Unfortunately, as a recent article published by American geographer Reece Jones (“Why Border Walls Fail”, Project Syndicate, September 2015) clearly proves, putting up fences between the US and Mexico, or as now around the European Union, only marginally slows down the influx of illegal immigrants. Moreover, as Reece Jones argues, fences are mainly meant to stop poor people from entering a richer country or region. That’s because people with means will always find alternative ways to reach their desired destination: fake papers and passports, bribes and so on.

At the end of WWII, according to a Canadian specialist, only five border fences or walls existed in the world, the best-known of them all being the Berlin Wall. Today we have no less than sixty-five, with two thirds of them having been built in the last twenty years. Expensive and inefficient, they stand proof however of flawed neoliberal thinking and vain efforts to securitize frontiers sometimes stretching for thousands of kilometres.

By abandoning such misguided efforts and by concentrating instead on slowing down or regularizing the flow of migrants, and by tackling the root problems that had forced them to leave in the first place, we will be in a better position to arrive at a humane solution to the plight of illegal migrants and refugees.

Sure, migrants should not be allowed to make a mockery of the EU’s external borders, even if all the billions spent on securing them were in fact a dodgy investment. Alas, most politicians would prefer to listen to sellers of border surveillance hardware than to finance a comprehensive study provided by geopolitical consultants such as myself, which would probably save their taxpayers large amounts of money. Migrants should be made to understand, as much as possible, that they should wait for their resettlement or asylum papers in the few “hot spots” (in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Greece, Italy, Serbia and possibly Bulgaria) created by the Union and the UN to that end, instead of arriving or stampeding in very large numbers inside the countries of their choice in Europe.

To be an effective deterrent against mass migration, however, such centers should provide decent accommodation and nourishment to refugees – which has not been the case until recently, according to the UNHCR – as well as fair and speedy processing of asylum applications that should become the norm and not the exception.

The EU and the Migrant Crisis

 September 13, 2015

For a continent long renowned for the excellent quality of its primary and secondary education, the beginning of the school year was until recently the season’s most important event. Not anymore. From Budapest to Brussels, government and Union officials have their hands full with the migrants’ crisis, which threatens to get out of control.

TV screens and the printed European media are full of images of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees heading for Germany as if they were heading for a second Mecca. Why Germany ? Syrians know fully well that the southern members of the Union have had their economies devastated by years of austerity and therefore could not provide the social benefits that Germany alone seems able to afford. Sure, a few hundred migrants have trickled into Denmark, Sweden or the Netherlands, but the governments and population of these countries are far less willing to accept their asylum demands.

Then there are Angela Merkel’s statements to the effect that all migrants who can reach Germany will be accepted, which have aggravated the latest exodus from Turkey. The reason why she has made such an uninspired statement – when it was already clear that the Syrians do not need additional encouragement – will remain a mystery to me. As a consequence of it, the EU is experiencing another serious split between its Western European states and the newer, ex-Soviet EU members. Hungary and the Visegrad countries have flatly refused the idea of compulsory quotas of migrants to be accommodated in their countries, while their leaders are doing their darnedest to stem the flow of Syrians towards Germany.

After the euro crisis which has provoked a split between the North and the South of the continent, a second split between West and East could further endanger the very existence of the EU. Already, opinion leaders and politicians from the Visegrad countries and even Romania have accused the EU Commission of adopting the behaviour they used to know during Soviet times. If this is not ominous for the future of the EU, I don’t know what is…

Why the Berlin Consensus is Toxic for the EU

 August 31, 2015

Over the past fifteen years, quite a lot of criticism has been levelled by the “MIT gang”° against what has become known as the Washington consensus. Very little or no public discussion, however, has taken place about its close European offshoot, the Berlin consensus.

Sure, there are some differences between the neoliberal economic thinking underpinning the Washington consensus concept and the Berlin consensus. For better or for worse, the pitfalls in promoting mass privatizations, currency and capital markets liberalization around the globe are too well-known to all to insist upon here. What the Washington and the Berlin consensus have in common, on the other hand, is the “one-size-fits-all” approach to solving economic problems.

The policies shaping today’s Berlin consensus have appeared during the nineties in connection with the introduction of the common currency. The main tenets of the Berlin consensus are derived from the German economic doctrine of ordoliberalism and the project of Walther Funk, Hitler’s minister of the economy.

Alas, what works for Germany does not work for the rest of the eurozone. The Maastricht Treaty, the budgetary and public debt rules and limitations, as well as the accompanying austerity measures have been enshrined, following the sovereign debt and euro crises, into the constitutions of most eurozone member countries. The six-pack and the two-pack compacts have also become part of the financial legislation of the eurozone.

And here lies the problem. The rigidity or inflexibility of the rules and principles on which the Berlin consensus is based, whilst it might favour an export economy like Germany’s, is playing havoc with economies like France’s and Italy’s, to mention but a few. The German obsession with very low inflation, low wages and zero budget deficit targets has provoked the stagnation of most eurozone economies. In the normal order of things there are surplus countries and deficit countries, since it is not possible to transform the whole continent into a global exporting powerhouse. This is the main reason why imposing the Berlin consensus on all of the eurozone’s member states is proving not only wrong, but downright catastrophic.

Still, compliant governments from France to Greece have made huge efforts to cut government expenditure, freeze or diminish wages and transform their consumer-led economies into export champions. Some, like Portugal and Spain have temporarily succeeded in doing so, but only by repressing internal demand, cutting wages and tolerating high unemployment rates.

The German way, unfortunately, is that of adapting the economy to the needs of price stability, and not the currency to the needs of the economy. For German policymakers, the flexibility has to come from the workers, not from the rules governing the economy. The fact that the eurozone has ceased to work – following the imposition of the Berlin consensus – is by now clear for all to see.

As it always happens when the groupthink phenomenon manifests itself, however, EU leaders prefer to justify the unjustifiable and to delay needed changes in policy until it will be too late to save not only the common currency area, but the EU as a political union as well. (The Eurogroup is a textbook example of groupthink.)

Accordingly, it is time for knowledgeable insiders – such as Yanis Varoufakis, for example – to clearly and concisely explain to the European layman why the Berlin consensus is toxic for the eurozone and what can be done about it. Surely, one cannot expect such a demanding intellectual effort to be undertaken by the likes of Wolfgang Schaeuble, Jeroen Dijsselbloem or say… the German Council of Economists. And, who knows? A timely and well-written book on this subject might even become a best-seller here in Europe.

°Note: The “MIT gang” is a group of leading American and French economists, such as Paul Krugman, Ben Bernanke, Olivier Blanchard, Maurice Obstfeld, who have studied economics at MIT at about the same time and have continued to promote Keynesian macro-economic remedies, as opposed to supply-side economic remedies, in addressing economic downturns.

Dark clouds on the Eurozone Sky

 August 3, 2015

In Wolfgang Schaeuble’s Germano-centric EU, no institution is more important – apart from his Politburo-like Eurogroup and the Office of the Chancellor – than his Ministry’s Council of Economic Advisers. The most influential adviser among them is Professor Hans-Werner Sinn from Munich, a Christian missionary-manqué turned tele-economist.

Like any good German, Professor Sinn has but a few ideas, but fixed, which he peddles forcefully with evangelic zeal in the national and international media. That is, when he is not using them as ideological tonic poured regularly in his Finance Minister’s ear.

When he doesn’t appear on TV to explain to his nation why the euro-crisis is like a bottomless pit for German money, or impart advice to the lawyer-trained flock which dominates the Eurogroup, Professor Sinn presides the Ifo think tank in Munich where he benevolently enforces – according to his hapless colleagues – a virulent form of “intellectual despotism”.

One of the fixed ideas Professor Sinn has advocated in the media and to Wolfgang Schaeuble since 2012 is of course that of Grexit. He is apparently convinced that countries like Greece and Portugal would need an internal devaluation of their wages and pensions of between 30 and 40 percent in order to shore up their competitiveness, compared to a 10 to 20 percent devaluation in Spain and Italy. Such steep reductions would not possible without generating huge social strife within the European Union, therefore Greece or Portugal should temporarily exit the eurozone. Thus, instead of resorting to this internal devaluation (read drastic reductions of salaries and pensions), they would revert for a while to their national currencies, which could be devalued and used as shock-absorbers while at the same time reducing their debt load via haircuts.

This simplistic way of trying to “solve” a complex situation has been lapped up by Wolfgang Schaeuble, like he did with another incredibly stupid idea: the “schwarze null” option as the main goal of budgetary policy. (It seems that neither surpluses nor deficits are desirable in Schaeuble’s world.)

To make his ideas triumph, Hans-Werner Sinn has blown out of the water all other options, such as “dexit”, or two EU currency zones, which was put forward as early as 2011 by a much more thoughtful colleague of his from Munich, Professor Alfred Steinherr. How exactly has Sinn achieved that ? By presenting – in a 2013 Project Syndicate commentary – the dexit option as if it were just another zany brainchild belonging to George Soros, knowing full well that in European capitals the billionaire’s reputation alone would be enough to kill any further debate on dexit.

Since the 13th of July 2015 diktat from Brussels, Professor Sinn and the five “wisemen” from the German Council of Economic Experts have aggressively started a campaign aimed at arming the Eurozone with new rules and procedures that would make the eviction of financially-shaky EU members easier. As lawyer-trained politicians generally find it hard to grasp complex economic arguments, this proposal could become EU official policy tomorrow. This could only make matters worse, as the adoption of exit rules will not contribute substantially to addressing the euro’s and the eurozone’s plight.

 

Undoing Germany's "Reluctant" Hegemony

 July 30, 2015

To those in the know, the Italian peninsula was not only the cradle of the Roman Empire or Rome the centre of the Catholic faithful, but also the birthplace of capitalism and of countless statecraft innovations and institutions still widely used around the world today.

During the middle ages, the Italian city-states thus discovered and perfected what is commonly known among IR specialists as the “balance of power” mechanism. Every time one of the city-states became too powerful economically or militarily and tried to subdue the others, most of the rest of the city-states would form a coalition against the offender, thus preserving their sovereignty over their economic and political affairs.

This time-honoured tradition continued long after the development of nation-states and was successfully used to control the hegemonic designs of European powers, such as France or Germany, to give but two of the best-known examples. For the past two centuries, until some sixty years ago, balance-of-power arrangements were initiated, financed and operated by Britain, which succeeded in defeating both Napoleon and Hitler and in bringing their hegemonic designs to an end. British leadership in this field prevented the loss of sovereignty by continental nations and during the 20th century it preserved democracy and the rule of law, albeit not always by peaceful means.

It would be a mistake to believe that old hegemonic designs nurtured by economically more powerful European nations have vanished since the creation of the European Union. If anything – as demonstrated by the recent developments from the 13th of July 2015 – such hegemonic efforts which chiefly belong to Germany are played out within the existing political structures and institutions of the European Union.

Institutions such as the Eurogroup, although they do not have a legal existence, nevertheless wield enormous power over the economic and financial affairs of EU member-countries since the introduction of the euro. Within this group, Germany plays the leading role and with the help of a few satellite-states makes all the important decisions.

There are other EU institutions, such as the ECB, the ESM or the Commission, that are manned by technocrats who have more decision-power than any elected political leader of any country. Here too, Germany has succeeded in throwing its economic weight around and has used the European Union’s design imperfections to establish its de facto leadership .

Reluctant or not, German dominance within the EU is by now an established fact and should be actively resisted by the rest of the EU member-states, like any other hegemonic episode in our continent’s history.

When one country becomes economically or militarily too powerful at the expense of all other members of the group it belongs to, there are usually two standard responses to such a situation: bandwagoning or balancing.

Today, countries like Austria, the Netherlands or the Baltic states have preferred to bandwagon, becoming German satellites in the process. They have displayed a propensity to endorse Wolfgang Schaeuble’s vision of “reform” for the EU’s structures. The German Finance Minister has declared during a conference at Brookings Institute in April 2015 that even Germany’s former arch-rival France, not only Greece, needs to be “restructured” by a troika, citing however “democracy” as a temporary stumbling block…

The other response – that is balancing – is the preferred method of Italy and France, consummate operators of balance-of-power mechanisms in the past. This is how Shahin Vallée, former advisor to ex-President Van Rompuy, has recently described the current situation in The New York Times:

“This forceful attitudes and the several taboos it broke reveal that the currency union that Germany wants is probably fundamentally incompatible with the one the French elite can sell and the French public can subscribe to. The choice soon will be whether Germany can build the euro it wants with France or whether the common currency falls apart.

Germany could undoubtedly build a very successful monetary union with the Baltic countries, the Netherlands and a few other nations, but it must understand that it will never build an economically successful and politically stable monetary union with France and the rest of Europe on these terms.

Over the long run, France, Italy and Spain to name just a few, would not take part in such a union, not because they can’t but because they wouldn’t want to. The collective GDP and population of these countries is twice that of Germany; eventually, a confrontation is inevitable.”

Since the 13th of July 2015, the number one priority in most EU capitals is no longer the Greek crisis, but how to deal with Germany’s latest hegemonic offensive. Ideally, a “Dexit” followed by the formation of a two-union Europe along the lines I have described in my earlier posts could replace the current dysfunctional union. Alternatively the union might disintegrate, USSR-style, into a myriad of nation-states large and small, dominated by populist or nationalist governments. Such a development, however, would gravely affect economic life as well as the security situation on our continent.

EU: What Are Latin Countries Waiting For ?

 July 23, 2015

Very few American experts grasp the motivations behind the construction of the European Union. As a result, American specialized literature abounds with misguided comparisons, such as that between the US Civil War from the 19th century and today’s tense situation between Europe’s North and South.

Yes, the EEC was initially formed in 1957 to prevent intra-European military conflicts in the future and to create a large-enough internal market for aspiring member-states to rebuild their economies and prosper.

Nonetheless, the European Union does not and will never have the same objectives as – to use another example in US commentary columns – American colonists did against British domination at the end of the 18th century. This is so because unlike nations around the world, the countries of Europe appeared on the ruins of the Roman Empire. Whenever politicians, kings, emperors and military leaders attempted to unite the continent’s nations into larger political units, their inspiration – whether consciously or not – has always been the Roman Empire.

Before 1957, quite a few European nations had tried their luck, rather unsuccessfully, at duplicating Roman hegemony across the continent. The emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, followed by Napoleon or Hitler have all done their best, in their own way, to emulate the Romans’ success by military means. Their efforts eventually ended up in failure, as no European nation was either big enough or strong enough to impose its will on all the others except for brief periods of time.

For the first time in the continent’s history, however, the launch of the political project of the European Union aimed to achieve unification by peaceful and democratic means. The experiment has been partially successful until two decades ago, when neoliberal policies and an ill-inspired monetary union have fatally undermined it.

When it comes to monetary union, it is also useful to remember that this was largely a French-inspired project which Germany joined only grudgingly. The first monetary union on the continent was also initiated by the French under the name of Latin monetary union (LMU). It lasted from 1865 to 1927 and included at first France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. Interestingly enough, the LMU was joined by Greece as early as 1867. The Latin bloc’s objective for all participating countries was to impose common standards for coinage at a time when the gold standard dominated commercial transactions on the continent. More astute than Germany of late, Austro-Hungary refused to join the LMU, as it rejected the bi-metallist approach of the French to coinage.

Today’s monetary union is now clearly in danger of disintegration, but preventing such an outcome is still possible. The first step in the right direction would be for the Latin group of countries to act again as a bloc. The latter should make it clear to Germany that a Dexit solution to the current predicament is necessary in order to salvage both the euro and what remains of European political unity. As matters now stand, the political systems of the southern half of the Union are close to implosion, witness recent developments in Greece, Spain, Italy and even France. Germany, meanwhile, does not only enjoy a healthy economic growth rate, but is basking in a political stability obtained at the expense of every other country in the Union…

Again, the historical experience inherited from the Roman Empire is a very useful guide to preventing a Soviet-type implosion of the union. Naturally, Germany’s recurring hegemonic tendencies and the fact that it has benefitted handsomely from the introduction of the euro for its exports, mean that in Berlin there is at present no appetite for doing the right thing by its European partners. This fundamental lack of empathy with the difficulties experienced by economically and politically less stable members of the EU has been proved time and again, with the EU leaders’ conference held on the 13th of July 2015 being just the latest in a string of such episodes.

Still, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal need to get together to gently ease Germany out of the euro and subsequently of the EU. As I have explained elsewhere, the German departure from the current financial and political structures of the Union should not, however, be an acrimonious process. After all, a diminished but more cohesive European Union will still have to trade and live side-by-side with Germany and its satellites, and vice-versa. For the political leaders of the Latin group of countries, however, there is no better solution to the euro-crisis than asking Germany to revert to the D-mark, as it is much better able to withstand an exit from the Eurozone than countries like Greece, Spain or even Italy.

EU: Grexit or Dexit ?

 July 19, 2015

Some seventeen centuries ago, emperor Diocletian realized that the Roman empire had grown too big and too diverse to be ruled from a single centre. Diocletian therefore decided to split it in two, the west ruled from Rome by a fellow army officer and the east controlled by himself. The east-west division became more or less permanent during the reign of Constantine. It was a wise administrative decision, which saved the integrity of the empire for another hundred years.

Fast forward to the present. The European Union, built on the ruins left behind by World War II, is experiencing a similar if not identical predicament. The citizens within its 28 member-countries, are growing more and more disenchanted with the Union’s leadership by the day. Truth be told, the EU has become much too big, too culturally diverse and politically unresponsive to continue to be viable in its present form.

One of the chief characteristics of the current political arrangements in the EU is Germany’s hegemonic status over its economic and political structures. As we can all recall, the Union was formed in the wake of WWII in order to prevent yet other military conflicts on the continent, involving again mainly Germany and its neighbours. To that end, an initial nucleus of six states (France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) created an economic union which helped all of them rebuild their war-shattered economies and prosper. The victorious powers led by the United States forgave Germany most of its debts, opened up their markets to German-made goods and supplied the seed capital necessary (Marshall Plan).

For six decades the European Union grew, expanding southwards and eastwards, while the German economy became a powerhouse on the continent. In the wake of the fall of communism and the implosion of the USSR, West Germany had reunited with East Germany, and started to dominate not only the continent’s economy but also its political and – since the introduction of the euro- its monetary affairs.

The latter developments have unfortunately proved to be an unmitigated disaster for all its other EU partners. In truth, events over the last decade – the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, austerity policies – have conclusively proved to many specialists that Germany, with a group of northern Protestant countries, has a vastly different set of economic responses and values, which are at odds with those prevalent in the southern part of the EU.

Thus, while Germans and their allies highly value a strong currency, low or zero inflation, low or zero budget deficits, a culture of thrift and the continuous reduction of public debt, countries like Italy, France and Spain – not to mention Greece, Portugal or Ireland – would prefer a significantly weaker euro, flexible budget deficit targets, higher inflation, the resorption of public debts through economic growth instead of austerity measures, and a massive reduction in the unemployment rates affecting them.

So far, Germany has succeeded in forcing all EU members to adopt its “six-pack” and “golden rule” and to maintain inflation close to zero. The outcome of these policies on the continent has translated into economic stagnation, social strife and a never-ending obsession with austerity and public debt reduction measures.

The current Greek crisis has merely highlighted the folly of such policies, as well as the unshaking determination of the German leadership to push the entire continent towards economic ruin. To avoid this, which could only lead to an USSR-type implosion of the Union, it would be more rational for Germany to leave it, reintroduce its beloved deutschemark and form an economic and political union of its own in the north of the continent. In other words, for the European Union to be saved from impending collapse, a “Dexit” option – and not “Grexit” – is what is currently needed. (Greece would not be able to threaten the survival of the EU the way Germany does.)

A Dexit should by no means be an acrimonious affair, or a disorderly one. Angela Merkel herself had alluded to the possibility of forming a Baltic Union as early as 2008. Starting with 2012, economists such as Alfred Steinherr, Anatole Kaletsky, Michael Mross, Aleš Michl, Kenneth Griffin, Anil Kashyap, Guillermo Nielsen, Ashoka Mody , Rolf Weder and Pedro Braz Teixeira have started recommending Dexit as the solution to the EU’s current economic and political predicament. The advantages of Dexit are clearly explained in a Time article from 2012:

 

“By contrast, if Germany were the one to leave, the euro would be the currency that falls in value, relative to Germany’s new national currency and also to the dollar. The weaker European countries would get to keep the euro but still get the devaluation they need, which would reduce their labor costs far less painfully than through wage cuts. In addition, the value of their outstanding debt would decline along with the value of the euro, and they would be more likely to be able to make payments on that debt and avoid defaulting.”

 

Viewed in this light, the third Greek bailout about to be concluded is rather of secondary importance. What is now needed is to start planning for an amiable and orderly Dexit, one which would benefit all EU member states. Failing to agree with the partition of the current Union into two entities – namely, an European Union centered around France and Italy and a Baltic one centered around Germany – could only result in a violent, USSR-type disintegration, accompanied by social strife, the revival of nationalism and xenophobia on our continent. Fortunately, such a partition will not lead to military conflict between the two sides further down the track, as NATO will still be there to prevent any such developments.