Ukraine: It's High Time for Plan B

 July 29, 2014

One hundred years to the day, the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural state model received its first major blow. A few years later in the wake the first world war, the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian monarchy collapsed and was replaced by a plethora of new national states.

Not all of these states, however, were built as purely ethnic entities. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, for example, tried to uphold the model for another 70 years, with the help of the Soviet Union.

We all know the ending by now. Both countries, including the Soviet Union, imploded and new national states emerged from their ashes: Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Kosovo, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia, Belarus and, last but not least, Ukraine.

Alas, from its inception, the brand new Ukrainian state contained the seeds of its own destruction. As Samuel Huntington rightly predicted in “The Clash”, the faultline which separates western Ukraine from eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainians proper from the Russophones, has become the theatre of a bloody civil war.

For reasons unknown to international relations and diplomacy, current western leaders prefer to ignore the fact that Ukraine is about to disintegrate along ethnic lines and that keping it within its current borders is not only unfeasible but downright dangerous for the peace of Europe. The stupidity of singling out Vladimir Putin’s administration for the situation there and of slapping sanctions after sanctions on Russia could only make matters worse.

It is high time therefore to search for a diplomatic way out of the Ukrainian quagmire. One such solution has been offered by two American historians and geopoliticians, James D. Hardy and Leonard J. Hochberg. In a series of articles from the 6th of May, 2014 (“The Ukrainian Crisis, Part III – the Deal”), the two American specialists outlined the so-called Plan B to the current sanctions campaign against Russia:

 

“It is ‘Plan B’. But a least worst position is not by definition either unreasonable nor undesirable. In this case, a divided Ukraine – provided the border is along the civilizational fault line – between Russia and the west makes sense on every level. It reduces tensions, encourages economic growth, takes account of real, not artificial, cultural and ethnic borders, increases the chances for Russian-European cooperation, prevents Ukrainian disintegration, and rescues America from another foreign policy blunder. A partial win, all around.”

In truth, western and Russian politicians are well-advised to arrive at a diplomatic solution for Ukraine sooner rather than later, as the performance of the global economy has started to be seriously affected by this geopolitical tug-of-war between the US and Russia. Furthermore, no politician worth his name could these days advocate the pumping of money and military assistance into a multi-ethnic state in turmoil that has no real chance of surviving as such within its current borders.

As a Romanian historian and geopolitician, I endorse such a diplomatic solution, with the amendment that the territories of south-western Ukraine inhabited by a Romanian-speaking majority, which had been taken away as a result of Stalin’s Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, are allowed to reunite with Romania.

 

Russia, the Eurasian Union and the US

 May 11, 2014

Current developments in Ukraine might lead us to forget why the crisis has erupted in the first place. In short, Putin’s project for an Eurasian Union and his desire to include Ukraine within it had prompted the Maidan protests and the overthrow of the Yanukovych administration.

Less debated these days is Mrs Clinton’s role in the chain of events which were set in motion in Dublin in 2012. On that occasion, she participated at an OSCE conference where she made it clear that the US was adamantly opposed to Putin’s Eurasian Union, wrongly dubbing it “a move to re-sovietize the region”.

In a highly prophetic article from 2012, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a Security Studies professor at the US Naval War College, contended however the following:

“The U.S. position, as stated by Clinton, is that Washington would not like to see any sort of Eurasian Union emerge, in any way, shape or form. Given the process already underway in terms of forging closer economic links between Russia and other post-Soviet states, this is not a realistic approach to take. Instead, U.S. policymakers should be asking themselves two questions: Is the cooperation being proffered by Moscow on other issues of concern to the U.S. of sufficient value to accept a greater degree of Russian influence and control in the Eurasian space? And are fundamental U.S. interests, as opposed to American preferences, threatened if Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan adopt institutions modeled on the European Union?

If the answers to the previous questions are yes and no, respectively, shifting the U.S. position from all-out opposition to any form of Eurasian integration in favor of a process that builds stronger protections for individual state sovereignty and preserves some degree of openness in the Eurasian space for countries to have trade and security relationships with the West makes more sense. A Eurasian Union that is simply a more developed customs union in which post-Soviet states freely participate — in part because the free flow of goods, capital and labor across the Eurasian space makes good economic sense for all parties concerned — should not be viewed in the same vein as attempts to forcibly recreate the Soviet Union.

If the Obama administration adopts this more flexible position, then it will be able to manage the tension between the Russian preference for a more consolidated Eurasian space and the U.S. desire for preserving the independence of the post-Soviet states. But if Clinton’s position as expressed in Dublin is enshrined as the U.S. perspective, this will become an area for conflict between the two countries, one that will very likely nullify the reset once and for all.”

Mrs Clinton’s foreign policy exploits has left us with the Ukrainian crisis. Today she is considering running for President. Should we prepare for WW III in case she wins the elections in the US ?
Link to the full article below:
The Realist Prism: U.S. Stance on Eurasian Union Threatens Russia Reset

Can Ukrainians Avoid a Break-up of their Country ?

 February 23, 2014

Saturday’s collapse of the accord brokered on Friday by the three EU foreign ministers in Kiev calls into question the wisdom of Western involvement in Ukraine. Over here we all knew that Ukraine was not only a new country on the map of Europe, but also very vulnerable to being partitioned in two by superpowers with geopolitical designs in the region. The 2004 US-inspired “orange” revolution in Russia’s “near-abroad” security zone has led nowhere. Once again, the direct involvement of the US will conceivably have similar results and the victim is going to be the Ukrainian population.

Following the events in Kiev, Russia has announced that it will suspend its promised financial assistance package to the country and, presumably, cheap gas prices are gone as well. Ukraine is facing economic ruin, social strife and an uncertain political future.

To their credit, no EU politician has supported calls for the demise of the President and the EU is not in any way responsible for the subsequent implosion of the Ukrainian political system. Nation-building is a difficult endeavor at the best of times, and Ukrainians are in desperately short supply of capable, un-corrupt politicians or specialists with statecraft skills.

If the country is to avoid partition, a few useful lessons learned by neighbouring Romania might come in handy. As Ukraine has 25 million citizens living in its pro-Russian zone, it should always elect a President hailing from that region.
In order to satisfy the aspirations of its Western, pro-European citizens, a future Ukrainian constitution should mandate that the job of prime minister be allotted to a Western Ukrainian political leader. Last but not least, executive power should be exercised equally by the President and the chosen prime minister. The former should be henceforth elected directly by the population, whereas the prime minister should be chosen by Parliament. The president of the country should be relieved of his duties only via referendum, whilst the prime minister could be replaced by a vote of the majority of parliamentarians.

These are but a few constitutional changes that might help prevent the break-up of Ukraine and improve the functioning of state institutions in the future. The rest is up to the Ukrainian people themselves.

Ukraine's Ongoing Geopolitical Quandary

January 31, 2014

About four years ago I have written a post on the tense geopolitical situation affecting the internal affairs of Romania and Ukraine. I provide readers with its link below because I believe it is as relevant today as it was then, and also because a high-ranking White House official freely admits that the US and Russia have the bad habit of using Ukraine as a ‘theatre of war’ in their rivalry.

http://florianpantazi.blogspot.fr/2010/01/despre-neamestecul-in-treburile-interne.html

 

And here is a link to Mark Medish’s original article on Ukraine from International Herald Tribune :

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/opinion/23iht-edmedish.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Davos in the Age of Geopolitics

 January 26, 2014

The 2014 annual gathering of the world’s business and financial elite in Davos was initially supposed to consider major issues of our time, such as inequality and climate change. I say consider and not debate because one cannot rationally expect a serious discussion of possible ways to tackle inequality at a conference which reunites its chief promoters.

At least equally important would have been a debate about the threat of secular (or great) stagnation, whose specter is hovering over Japan, USA and Western Europe and seriously harming the export potential of emerging countries’ economies. The polichinelle secret is that the West’s insistence on plunging the world into fully-fledged economic and political liberalization has backfired badly. It is now in the process of spewing instability, revolutions and regional armed conflicts around the world. Sadly, the global liberalization agenda looks today every bit as utopic as the communist blueprint had been in its time.

Instead of global economics, Davos guests have had to busy themselves with current geopolitical developments. Of course it isn’t easy to talk about a global economic recovery when only profits and share prices are on the rebound, when middle class incomes have at best remained stagnant or have at worst been drastically reduced (as in Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal or Ireland) and unemployment is high. Global demand remains stubbornly sluggish, a sure sign that Adam Smith’s “trickle-down” effect has failed to work, yet again, in the absence of resolute government-led redistribution policies. This is why leading economists are as yet loath to call this a full economic recovery. Progressive economists concentrate their attention on recommendations for diminishing inequality, alleviating poverty and boosting aggregate demand. As always, the orthodox ones are engaged in defending austerity and low taxes, however disastrous the consequences.

The center stage at the Davos conference, therefore, was taken up by political leaders hard-pressed to deal with intricate geopolitical developments in their respective regions. The Ukrainian prime minister thus took pains to explain why the two-month unrest that followed President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign a trade deal with the European Union was about to turn ugly in Kyiv. Shinzo Abe, “the troublemaker”, did not miss the opportunity to blast China’s bellicose stance – and vice versa from the Chinese delegation’s side. In a CNN interview, the Egyptian prime minister defended the brutal repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and even had the cheek to compare General Al-Sissi’s potential candidacy to the presidency with those of General De Gaulle’s or Eisenhower’s. (Following his incredible televised performance, one is left wondering just when did the latter order the army to open fire on their own citizens in order to qualify for the top job ?) Syria’s elusive peace talks and potential political future were discussed by newly-elected President Rouhani of Iran, even as the peace negotiations next door in Geneva were apparently leading nowhere. Meanwhile, the civil war raging in Syria is spreading to Lebanon and Iraq. Ethnic and tribal conflicts are engulfing chunks of Africa, from Mali and Central Africa to South Sudan. For the first time in a long while, the West seems neither willing nor able to foster peace in all these regions, diplomatic and military efforts notwithstanding.

Alas, this is a far cry from the rosy “one-world ecstasy” scenario from Francis Fukuyama’s End of History best seller. For over a decade now, both history and geopolitics have been back with a vengeance to interpret how old, new or hitherto frozen conflicts are tearing countries and societies apart.

 

Fukuyama's "End of Democracy"

 November 25, 2013

The political gridlock in Washington DC gave Francis Fukuyama the opportunity to attack as unworkable one of the pillars the American democracy, namely the priciple of separation of powers . According to one of his recent articles ( republished by Courrier International) Obamacare has no real chance of success because the American political system is designed in a way that gives too much veto power to the opposition, thus depriving the Administration of real clout. He calls this “vetocracy“.

In actual fact, the crisis experienced by the American political system has very little to do with the way power is allocated within it and everything to do with the economic and social difficulties experienced since the 2008 financial crisis onwards. The spillover effect has now reached the political system, which itself cannot function in the absence of a minimal bipartisan political consensus . (no democratic system could)

Montesquieu’s principle of separation of powers and checks and balances was criticised as early as the XVIII century by, among others, the physiocrats . Their leader, Quesnay, nicknamed ” Confucius of Europe ” by his admirers, believed that ” the system of checks and balances within a government is a dismal one ” ( Quesnay, Maximes générales du guvernement économoque d’un royaume agricole). Condorcet considered that ” in matters of government ,every complication is scary” ( Réflexions sur le commerce des blés ) , and the list could go on. Undaunted, the framers of the American constitution, which served the US well for over two hundred years, adopted the principle.

To be sure, the US badly needs to extend universal medical coverage to some forty million Americans in order to be considered a truly civilised Western country. The timing of the reform does seem rather unfortunate, as the US federal deficit is one of the largest in America’s history. In truth, the US politicians lost a golden opportunity to adopt such a reform during the sixities, when the country’s economic circumstances were excellent and when the political leaders were less ideological and more pragmatic than it is the case today. In other words, Obamacare is some fifty years too late to be adopted quickly and without much resistance from vested interests.

When a democracy ceases to function the way it has been intended to, that usually happens because leading political players fail to reach consensus on major issues. It would therefore be wrong to blame the malfunctioning on the core principles – like that of the separation of powers – on which the American system has been built upon. Fukuyama even argues that the Westminster system is better equipped to prevent gridlock, although it does not seem to help David Cameron be a more powerful and/or succesful leader of Britain . Moreover, the Westminster system could lead to an ” elective dictatorship“, as the development is known among political scientists. This is exactly the outcome the American framers tried to avoid when they adopted the separation of powers principle.. Nor is the French presidential system, in which the Socialist executive has more power than the American president does and the Socialist party controls both the Parliament AND the regions, in a better position to solve the country’s economic or social problems . Unemployment in France is much higher than in the States or Germany, whilst economic growth has all but stalled. Germany, a federal state, does not seem to be affected by the way power is distributed within the system. Clearly, Fukuyama’s theoretical approach to US’s political problems is not only flawed, but it is also misleading .

Geography and Geopolitics During the Cold War

 November 16, 2013

Since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, it has again become fashionable to explain southern Europe’s economic troubles in the light of the Mediterranean countries’s natural habitat, climate and lifestyle. The people of Greece, Spain and Italy, for example, are regularly portrayed in the popular press as less productive and laid back, in contrast with northern EU nationals. The latter are presented as industrious, thrifty and unlucky enough to be part of a union which makes them dip into their hard-earned savings to pay for the excesses and profligacy of southern EU members.

A heightened interest among philosophers, historians, economists and geopoliticians in the influence of geography/natural habitat over the course taken by human history or economic development is quite normal, especially during major crises. This type of intellectual inquiry happened to be the object of my research for my licence thesis in 1979 at Iasi University. Trouble was, during the bi-polar world both superpowers shared a common dislike of Geography and its potential role in human history and economic affairs. Their respective satellite-countries largely fell into line during that period, with the shining exception of France, where the research and study of Human Geography continued regardless.

Indeed, for decades both Russians and Americans all but banned academic research along these lines. The very mention of geopolitics was regarded as subversive. In a book written at the end of the ‘90s (« The Wealth and Poverty of Nations »), Harvard historian David S. Landes explains how after 1945 US authorities actually closed down the geography departments at Harvard, Yale, Princeton and Columbia, to mention but a few academic establishments. The Soviet Union also developed a powerful aversion to geography, probably because during the 1930s Stalin fell for Mackinder’s well-known Heartland theory, which had led him to conclude the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Nazis (Pascal Lorot).

This is the reason why it took me a long time, as an undergraduate, to convince one of my gutsier professors to supervise my thesis. To make matters worse, documentation behind the Iron Curtain was painfully scarce, especially from American sources. In the background, the dean of the faculy was constantly at pains to impress upon me that we were only 25km away from the Soviet border. What would we do if my thesis incurred the wrath of the Russians ?

These days, when both geographers and experts in geopolitics are back in vogue, I think it is worthwhile remembering how detrimental the Soviet-American duopoly really was for the development of social sciences in general and that of geography and geopolitics in particular.